brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash
위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV
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CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H상세 설명
Summary
expand() bounds the number of results it produces (the max option,
100_000 by default) but not their length. By chaining many brace groups,
an attacker keeps the result count under max while making every result grow
with the number of groups. Building max long results — plus the intermediate
arrays combined at each brace group — exhausts memory and crashes the Node
process with an uncatchable out-of-memory error. try/catch around
expand() does not help: the fatal error terminates the process.
A ~7.5 KB input ('{a,b}'.repeat(1500)) is enough to crash a default Node
process.
Details
For N chained brace groups such as '{a,b}'.repeat(N):
- the result count is
2^N, immediately capped atmax(100_000), so the
maxprotection appears to hold, but - each result is
Ncharacters long, so the total output size is
max × Ncharacters, which grows without bound inN.
expand_ combines each brace set with the fully-expanded tail:
1const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''] 2... 3for (let j = 0; j < N.length; j++) { 4 for (let k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) { 5 const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k] // grows one group longer per level 6 ... 7 expansions.push(expansion) 8 } 9}The loop guard expansions.length < max limits how many strings are built, but
nothing limits how long they get. Each recursion level materializes another
array of up to max strings, one character longer than the level below, and —
because V8 represents pre + N[j] + post[k] as a cons-string (rope) that
references post[k] — those intermediate strings stay reachable through the
whole chain. Memory therefore scales with max × N.
Measured on 5.0.7 ('{a,b}'.repeat(N), default max):
| groups (N) | input bytes | result count | peak RSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | 100 | 100,000 | ~80 MB |
| 50 | 250 | 100,000 | ~214 MB |
| 100 | 500 | 100,000 | ~409 MB |
| 300 | 1,500 | 100,000 | ~1,148 MB |
| 1500 | 7,500 | — | OOM crash |
Proof of concept
1const { expand } = require('brace-expansion') 2 3// ~7.5 KB input — crashes the process with a fatal, uncatchable OOM: 4// FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory 5try { 6 expand('{a,b}'.repeat(1500)) 7} catch (e) { 8 // never reached — the process is already dead 9}Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to
brace-expansion.expand() — directly, or transitively via minimatch / glob
brace patterns — can be crashed by a small request. Because the failure is a
fatal V8 out-of-memory error rather than a thrown exception, it cannot be caught
and it takes down the whole worker/process, denying service.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix bounds the total number of characters a
single expand() call may accumulate (EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH, default
4_000_000, configurable via a new maxLength option), applied inside the
output-building loops so intermediate arrays are bounded too. Once the limit is
reached, output is truncated — consistent with how max already truncates —
instead of growing without bound. The limit sits well above any realistic
expansion (100,000 results hitting max measure ~1M characters), so legitimate
input is unaffected.
After the fix, '{a,b}'.repeat(1500) returns a bounded, truncated result in
~0.7 s using ~340 MB and never crashes, including under a constrained 512 MB
heap.
The fix bounds memory but the algorithm still rebuilds intermediate arrays at
each level (roughly O(N × maxLength) work on this input class). A streaming
rewrite that produces output in O(total output size) can be a non-urgent
follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to
expand() / glob brace patterns, or pass a small explicit max and
maxLength.
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