net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft

When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(),
rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical
section before returning ct_ft.
The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero()
is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft
object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation.

Analysis from zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com:
When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers
tcf_ct_flow_table_get().

static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params)

{
struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone };
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
int err = -ENOMEM;

 1            mutex_lock(&zones_mutex);
 2            ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1]
 3            if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2]
 4                            goto out_unlock;
 5            ...

}

static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast(
struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key,
const struct rhashtable_params params)
{
void *obj;

 1            rcu_read_lock();
 2            obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params);
 3            rcu_read_unlock();
 4 
 5            return obj;

}

At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft
from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section
through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from
being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has
already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed
before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes
the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed.

Free Process:

tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu()
tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put().

static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) {
rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params);
INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3]
queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork);
}
}

At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work

static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work)

{
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
struct flow_block *block;

 1            ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table,
 2                                                            rwork);
 3            nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft);
 4            block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block;
 5            down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
 6            WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list));
 7            up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
 8            kfree(ct_ft); // [4]
 9 
10            module_put(THIS_MODULE);

}

tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes
between [1] and [2], UAF occurs.

This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally
difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was
inserted after[1]