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CVE-2026-55235MEDIUM· 5.9GHSA대응게시일: 2026. 08. 19.수정일: 2026. 08. 19.

langgraph-api: Relative webhook targets in LangGraph Server can reach in-process routes without authentication

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
5.9medium

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS

예측 데이터 없음

KEV
미등재

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권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)

외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

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공격 벡터네트워크
공격 복잡도높음
필요 권한낮음
사용자 상호작용불필요
범위불변
영향
기밀성 영향없음
무결성 영향높음
가용성 영향낮음
버전별 점수
CVSS 3.15.9MODERATE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

상세 설명

Summary

In affected versions of langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server's own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.

In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user's thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.

We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.

Affected users / systems

You may be affected if you:

  • run langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),
  • allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets, and
  • rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs between users.

Impact

  • Integrity: creation of a run on, or modification of the state of, a thread owned by another user, beyond the requesting user's authorization scope.
  • Confidentiality: limited exposure of another user's thread metadata, incorporated into the created run record.

Patches / mitigation

The webhook URL policy now denies loopback delivery by default: the webhooks.url.disable_loopback policy defaults to enabled. This covers relative webhook targets routed through the in-process transport, as well as localhost-style hostnames, loopback address ranges, and hostnames that resolve into the loopback range. Deployments that legitimately deliver webhooks to a route hosted on the same process can opt back in by setting webhooks.url.disable_loopback: false in langgraph.json (or the equivalent LANGGRAPH_WEBHOOKS configuration); do so only when you control the routes those webhooks reach, as they are delivered without authentication. Fixed in langgraph-api 0.10.0.

Operational guidance

  • Upgrade to a release containing this change and keep loopback webhook delivery disabled unless required.
  • If loopback delivery is enabled, restrict it to routes you control and apply authorization within those routes.

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