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CVE-2026-55252MEDIUMGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 09.수정일: 2026. 07. 09.

OpenRun: Redirect URL validation bypass using  //host  paths leads to Open Redirect

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
medium

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS

예측 데이터 없음

KEV
미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)

외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

CVSS 벡터 정보 없음

상세 설명

Summary

The restrictions on redirect URLs in openrun can be bypassed by attackers, leading to open redirect attacks.

Details

In the current project, the referrer header value is used for subsequent redirects, so there is currently a validation for this redirect value. The current validation logic requires that the host and schema of the redirect URL be the same as the current website's URL, and finally, the path part is used for redirection. This check seems robust, but it can still be bypassed by attackers.

<img width="1606" height="1346" alt="QQ20260602-140205-2-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83c549f3-38d7-444d-90f0-131d806f67ff" />

Here's the problem: Assuming the current website is http://127.0.0.1:25222/, if the attacker passes in a redirect URL of http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com, its host and schema are obviously the same as the current website, thus bypassing the verification. However, the issue lies in the final redirect URL, which is the path part of the URL, i.e., //fushuling.com.

Browsers automatically complete the HTTP header for URLs starting with //, ultimately successfully bypassing the restriction and redirecting to the external address http://fushuling.com.

This vulnerable behavior was successfully reproduced locally. Normally, specifying an external address directly will be blocked, so it will not redirect.

<img width="1587" height="717" alt="QQ20260602-140756-2-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51430c42-bd10-401b-9c9f-27a91a0bc648" />

However, if the redirect URL is http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com, the existing validation logic is bypassed, and the Location header is successfully set to //fushuling.com.

http
1POST /redirecttest/abc/frag HTTP/1.1
2Host: 127.0.0.1:25222
3Referer: http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com
4Cache-Control: max-age=0
5sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="24", "Chromium";v="122"
6sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
7sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
8Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.6261.57 Safari/537.36
10Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
11Sec-Fetch-Site: none
12Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
13Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
14Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
15Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
16Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
17Connection: close
18Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
19Content-Length: 0
<img width="1536" height="729" alt="QQ20260602-140925-2-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31fde919-5f90-409f-8b14-af6c9c71761b" />

The user was then successfully redirected to the external address http://fushuling.com.

<img width="1692" height="855" alt="QQ20260602-141005-2-5" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83b43ef6-52fa-4218-908b-7795394ae707" />

PoC

text
1http://127.0.0.1:25222//fushuling.com

Impact

Open Redirect

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