MariaDB Connector/J does not enforce allowLocalInfile=false on server-initiated LOCAL INFILE requests

MariaDB Connector/J does not enforce allowLocalInfile=false when
processing server-initiated LOCAL INFILE requests (protocol packet
type 0xfb). However, exploitation is constrained: the server can
only request the exact filename the client already included in its
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE query, it cannot redirect to arbitrary paths.

When a client executes LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/path/to/file', the
connector sends the filename to the server as part of the COM_QUERY.
A rogue or MitM server responds with a 0xfb packet echoing that
same filename. The connector, without checking allowLocalInfile,
transmits the file content.

The bypass is therefore limited to the file the application itself
intended to load. The attacker cannot escalate to other files
(e.g. /etc/passwd) unless the application's own query targets them.

The real-world risk is:

• An application that uses LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE on potentially
  sensitive files (credentials, exports, configs) and connects over
  an untrusted network.
• allowLocalInfile=false is supposed to disable this entire
  mechanism as a defense-in-depth measure, but the flag is ignored.

The security guarantee of allowLocalInfile=false is not upheld,
but practical exploitation requires both a MitM/rogue server and an
application that actively uses LOCAL INFILE on sensitive data.

Reported by tharavel