Snipe-IT: Stored XSS via Inline XML Rendering in the Uploaded Files API

Snipe-IT's uploaded-files API accepts XML documents and later serves them inline without applying the safe-inline allowlist used by the equivalent web controller. An authenticated user who can attach files to a supported object can upload an XSLT stylesheet and an XML document that references it through xml-stylesheet. When another authorized user opens the XML file through the API with ?inline=true, the browser applies the attacker-controlled stylesheet, which produces HTML containing JavaScript in the Snipe-IT origin.
This was reproduced against commit df8e3b144331d0c1cc14778f900e7646d1d9a509 (v8.6.3-231-gdf8e3b1443).

The attack requires an authenticated account with file access to at least one supported object and one victim interaction. Scope changes because attacker-controlled code executes in another user's Snipe-IT security context. The script can read same-origin data available to the victim and perform authenticated actions as that victim.

Affected Components

• app/Http/Requests/UploadFileRequest.php
  Allows xml uploads through filesystems.allowed_upload_extensions_for_validator.
  Sanitizes only files detected as image/svg+xml. Both files in this proof of concept are detected by PHP finfo as text/xml, so they are stored unchanged.
• config/filesystems.php
  Includes xml in allowed_upload_extensions_array.
• app/Http/Controllers/Api/UploadedFilesController.php, method show()
  Honors the attacker-controlled inline=true query parameter for every uploaded file type.
  Calls Storage::download(..., ['Content-Disposition' => 'inline']) without calling StorageHelper::allowSafeInline().
• routes/api.php
  Exposes the affected route as GET /api/v1/{object_type}/{id}/files/{file_id} for multiple object types.
• app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php
  The default CSP includes script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval', so it does not mitigate the injected inline script.
  The non-API UploadedFilesController::show() already calls StorageHelper::allowSafeInline() before returning an inline response. The missing equivalent check in the API controller creates the vulnerable behavior.
  Root Cause

File validation treats XML as an allowed attachment format, but the API download path treats all accepted formats as safe active browser content. Extension allowlisting for upload is not equivalent to determining whether a response is safe to render inline.
Laravel derives the response Content-Type from each stored file. It returns text/xml; charset=utf-8, while the controller overrides the normal attachment disposition with Content-Disposition: inline. Chromium processes the xml-stylesheet instruction, loads the second same-origin API attachment as XSLT, and executes script in the HTML document produced by the transform.

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the Snipe-IT origin when a victim opens the malicious attachment URL. Depending on the victim's privileges, this can enable:

• Reading same-origin pages and API responses available to the victim.
• Performing state-changing actions with the victim's session and privileges.
• Exposing sensitive asset, user, license, and configuration information.
• Administrative account compromise when a superuser opens the attachment.
• Cookies marked HttpOnly cannot be read directly, but this does not prevent same-origin authenticated requests or reading their responses.