In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns xfrm_send_migrate(

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns

xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate()
in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that
announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.

XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the
rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008.
The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using
xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path
was missed.

Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding:

1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the
   km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's
   XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on
   the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore
   receives migration notifications originating from any other
   netns on the host.

2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed
   to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the
   notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update
   handling inside a netns is silently broken.

Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate
function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate()
and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in
scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down.
struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API,
so the function-pointer signature change is internal.

pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net,
pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other
pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x),
sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the
&init_net outlier.