In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length Malicious SFP module cou

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length

Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than
what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes.
Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just
be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted,
so let's protect the kernel.

The existing check protects from short replies. We need to
protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero
rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct
and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation
or short-reply handling:

• cmis_cdb_validate_password()
• cmis_cdb_module_features_get()
• cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get()

so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not
have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message
to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong...

Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from
last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len.

Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload
itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack),
but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard,
so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like
defensive programming.