In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: close durable scavenger races against m_fp_list lookups ksmbd_d

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: close durable scavenger races against m_fp_list lookups

ksmbd_durable_scavenger() has two related races against any walker
that iterates f_ci->m_fp_list, including ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
(used by ksmbd_vfs_rename) and the share-mode checks in
fs/smb/server/smb_common.c.

(1) fp->node list-head reuse. Durable-preserved handles can remain
linked on f_ci->m_fp_list after session teardown so share-mode checks
still see them while the handle is reconnectable. The scavenger
collected expired handles by adding fp->node to a local
scavenger_list after removing them from the global durable idr.
Because fp->node is the same list_head used by m_fp_list,
list_add(&fp->node, &scavenger_list) overwrites the m_fp_list links
and corrupts both lists. CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST can report this on the
share-mode walk path.

(2) Refcount race against m_fp_list walkers. The scavenger qualifies
an expired durable handle with atomic_read(&fp->refcount) > 1 and
fp->conn under global_ft.lock, removes fp from global_ft, then drops
global_ft.lock before unlinking fp from m_fp_list and freeing it.
During that gap fp is still linked on m_fp_list with f_state ==
FP_INITED. ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() under m_lock read calls
ksmbd_fp_get() (atomic_inc_not_zero on refcount that is still 1) and
takes a live reference; the scavenger then unlinks and frees fp
while the holder owns a reference, leading to UAF on the holder's
subsequent ksmbd_fd_put() and on any field reads performed by a
concurrent share-mode walker that iterates m_fp_list without taking
ksmbd_fp_get() (smb_check_perm_dleases-like paths).

Fix both:

• Stop reusing fp->node as a scavenger-private list node. Remove
  one expired handle from global_ft under global_ft.lock, take an
  explicit transient reference, drop the lock, unlink fp->node
  from m_fp_list under f_ci->m_lock, then drop both the durable
  lifetime and transient references with atomic_sub_and_test(2,
  &fp->refcount). If the scavenger is the last putter the close
  runs there; otherwise an in-flight holder that already raced
  through the m_fp_list lookup owns the final close via its
  ksmbd_fd_put() path. The one-at-a-time disposal can rescan the
  durable idr when multiple handles expire in the same pass, but
  durable scavenging is a background expiration path and the final
  full scan recomputes min_timeout before the next wait.

• Clear fp->persistent_id inside __ksmbd_remove_durable_fd() right
  after idr_remove(), so a delayed final close from a holder that
  snatched fp does not re-issue idr_remove() on a persistent id
  that idr_alloc_cyclic() in ksmbd_open_durable_fd() may have
  already handed out to a brand-new durable handle.

• Bypass the per-conn open_files_count decrement in
  __put_fd_final() when fp is detached from any session table
  (fp->conn cleared by session_fd_check() at durable preserve --
  paired with the volatile_id clear at unpublish, so checking
  fp->conn alone is sufficient). The walker that owns the final
  close runs from an unrelated work->conn whose
  stats.open_files_count never tracked this durable fp; without
  this guard the holder would underflow that unrelated counter.

The two races are folded into one patch because patch (1) alone
cleans up the corrupted list but leaves a deterministic UAF window
for m_fp_list walkers that the transient-reference and
persistent_id discipline in (2) close; bisecting onto an
intermediate state would land on a UAF that pre-patch chaos merely
made less reproducible.

Validation:

• CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST coverage for the list_head reuse path.
• KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 durable-handle coverage that exercised
  ksmbd_durable_scavenger() and non-NULL ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode()
  returns while durable handles expired under concurrent rename
  lookups, with no KASAN, UAF, list-corruption, ODEBUG, or WARNING
  reports.
  ---truncated---