In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read The b

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read

The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT
path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):

 1if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &&
 2    sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) {

hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr)
evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses
sizeof(*hdr) consistently:

 1if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) {
 2...
 3if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) {
 4...
 5done += sizeof(*hdr);

struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields,
flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two
expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.

On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by
4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed
count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check,
then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len
bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.

It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct
iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check
should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer
width.

Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual
amount that will be copied.