In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry() In exfat_find_d

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()

In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:

 1if (++order == 2)
 2	uniname = p_uniname->name;
 3else
 4	uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
 5len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
 6name_len += len;
 7unichar = *(uniname+len);
 8*(uniname+len) = 0x0;

uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).

The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN guard
added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.