In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) Sashiko n

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD)

Sashiko notes:

if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
host?

The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note:

On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted.

That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the
firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do
anything if SNP has not been previously initialized.

This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a
mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be
maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead.