In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion log_replay() c

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: validate lcns_follow in log_replay conversion

log_replay() converts DIR_PAGE_ENTRY_32 records into DIR_PAGE_ENTRY
records when replaying version 0 restart tables.

During this conversion, the memmove() length is derived directly from
the on-disk lcns_follow field:

 1memmove(&dp->vcn, &dp0->vcn_low,
 2	2 * sizeof(u64) +
 3			le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow) * sizeof(u64));

check_rstbl() validates restart table structure, but does not constrain
per-entry lcns_follow values relative to the entry size. A malformed
filesystem image can provide an oversized lcns_follow value, causing
the conversion memmove() to access memory beyond the bounds of the
allocated restart table buffer.

The same field is later used to bound iteration over page_lcns[],
so validating lcns_follow during conversion also prevents downstream
out-of-bounds access from the same malformed metadata.

Compute the maximum valid lcns_follow from the already-validated
restart table entry size and reject entries that exceed this bound.
Reuse the existing t16/t32 scratch variables already declared in
log_replay() to avoid introducing new declarations.

[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed the conflicts]