In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo() Sinc

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()

Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions"),
path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap'd from a
superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this
way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the
warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel:

WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50
do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240
__x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70

init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never
path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets
them by default instead of each caller setting them.

SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one
visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a
dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion
enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable.

Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y:

make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps
sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system