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CVE-2026-6790MEDIUM· 5.3MITRENVDGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 07. 14.수정일: 2026. 07. 22.

Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

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CVSS
5.3medium

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EPSS
0.2%상위 90.4%

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CVSS 3.15.3MODERATE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

상세 설명

Summary

Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular
Host header and the pseudo-header :authority
do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities
through Jetty:

  • logic based on HttpURI / Request.getServerName(request) uses :authority
  • logic based on raw request headers continues to use Host

This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break
security assumptions in higher layers.

Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on
the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2
and HTTP/3 paths.

Security Impact

This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become
security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for
security-sensitive decisions, including:

  • host-based access control
  • virtual host isolation
  • multi-tenant routing by hostname
  • login/logout/callback URL construction
  • reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains
  • auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation

Potential consequences include:

  • bypass of host-based ACLs
  • virtual host or tenant isolation failures
  • incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets
  • inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host
  • misleading logs and audit records
Technical Root Cause
  1. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths:
  • :authority is parsed separately into authority/URI state
  • Host is preserved as a normal request header
  • the two values are not compared for consistency
  1. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 server entry paths:
  • Jetty calls ComplianceUtils.verify(httpCompliance, requestMetaData, listener)
  • this verification does not enforce MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
  1. On the HTTP/1.1 path:
  • Jetty explicitly checks whether authority and Host match
  • mismatches are rejected by default
Relevant Code Locations

HTTP/2 metadata builder:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-hpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/hpack/internal/MetaDataBuilder.java

HTTP/3 metadata builder:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-qpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/qpack/internal/metadata/MetaDataBuilder.java

HTTP/2 server entry:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP2.java

HTTP/3 server entry:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP3.java

Shared HTTP compliance verification:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/ComplianceUtils.java

HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:

  • jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/HttpConnection.java

Defined but not enforced on H2/H3:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/HttpCompliance.java
  • violation: MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
Reproduction

I reproduced this on local Jetty 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT source.

Minimal reproduction steps:

  1. Start a Jetty HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 test server.
  2. Send a request with:
    • :authority = localhost:<port>
    • Host = evil.example:<port>
  3. In the request handler, inspect both:
    • Request.getServerName(request)
    • request.getHeaders().get(HttpHeader.HOST)
  4. Observe whether Jetty rejects the request or allows both values to remain visible.
    Observed result:
    • HTTP/2: request is accepted and returns 200
    • HTTP/3: request is accepted and returns 200
    • the server can observe both:
      • serverName=localhost
      • hostHeader=evil.example:<port>

This shows that a single attacker-controlled request can preserve two conflicting host interpretations inside Jetty.

Tests Used

HTTP/2 rejection test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority

HTTP/2 exploitability test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader

HTTP/3 rejection test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority

HTTP/3 exploitability test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader

Observed behavior:

  • both rejection tests fail because Jetty returns 200 instead of 400
  • both exploitability tests pass, confirming that Jetty exposes different host values to different layers
Project-Internal Evidence of Real Impact

Examples:

  • jetty-openid uses Request.getServerName(request) to construct redirect URLs
  • jetty-ee11-proxy uses the raw Host header when building Forwarded

This indicates that the issue is not merely theoretical: Jetty’s own
ecosystem already contains code paths where different host sources are
used for different purposes.

Affected Version

Confirmed affected version:

  • 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT

Other versions may also be affected if they share the same HTTP/2 /
HTTP/3 request construction and compliance-validation logic. I have
not yet completed a historical version matrix and would recommend
confirming exact affected ranges from Jetty’s branch history.

Suggested Fix

Recommend adding HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 validation equivalent to the
existing HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:

  • if both :authority and regular Host are present
    • normalize and compare them
    • if they do not match, reject the request with 400 Bad Request
    • route the failure through the existing MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY compliance mechanism

Also adding explicit HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 regression coverage for this case.

Disclosure Status
  • not publicly disclosed
  • no public issue filed
  • shared only privately with the Jetty security contacts

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