In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify() The digest-length check

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()

The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:

 1if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
 2		iint->ima_hash->length)

sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote
the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction
runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:
a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)
turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.
The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads
iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer
vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.

Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:
ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default
algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than
failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value
reaches the length check as-is.

Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no
implicit conversion to size_t can occur.