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CVE-2026-74682UNKNOWNMITRENVD대응게시일: 2026. 08. 22.수정일: 2026. 08. 22.CNA: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67Received

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs data_ep_set_par

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상세 설명

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs

data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the
Format Type II transfer delimiter:

text
1u->packets = urb_packs;
2u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets;
3
4if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II)
5 u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */
6u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL);

buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never
recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of
the packet count the URB is built with.

prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never
consults buffer_size:

text
1offs = 0;
2for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) {
3 urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs;
4 urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize;
5 offs += ep->curpacksize;
6}
7
8urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs;
9urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets;

The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the
transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every
inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound
their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected.

fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any
device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets
hw_params on the stream.

KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report
per inbound transfer:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer
Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166
__asan_memcpy
dummy_timer
hrtimer_run_softirq
Allocated by task 166:
usb_alloc_coherent
snd_usb_endpoint_set_params
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0)

Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for,
and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already
does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by
one maxsize packet.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee baul.lee@xbow.com

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