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CVE-2026-79676HIGHMITRENVDGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 08. 25.수정일: 2026. 09. 08.

NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement

Path-Traversal

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
high

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS
0.3%상위 76.8%

30일 내 악용 확률 예측

KEV
미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한60일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

계획된 패치 주기 내 조치(60일 이내)

외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 어려움 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

CVSS 벡터 정보 없음

상세 설명

Summary

Several corpus readers still step outside NLTK's symlink-aware trusted-root model. They derive in-root paths from trusted corpus state, convert those paths back into plain strings, and reopen them with built-in open() rather than nltk.pathsec.open().

Details

  • Vulnerability type: Path traversal and symlink boundary bypass
  • Affected component: nltk.corpus.reader.ipipan, nltk.corpus.reader.crubadan, nltk.corpus.reader.lin
  • Affected versions: Published 3.9.4 and current source v3.10.0-rc2 both reproduced.
  • Patched versions: Not yet patched
  • Root cause: Root-derived paths are reopened with raw open() without preserving the trusted-root boundary.

IPIPANCorpusReader opens header.xml derived from morph.xml, CrubadanCorpusReader opens table.txt directly, and LinThesaurusCorpusReader opens simN.lsp paths returned from its own root helpers. Under pathsec.ENFORCE=True, a symlink placed inside the trusted corpus root can point outside the root and still be parsed successfully. It was confirmed parsed outside-root content is returned through public methods such as channels(), domains(), categories(), langs(), crubadan_to_iso(), synonyms(), and scored_synonyms().

PoC

Preconditions

  • The application processes attacker-influenced corpora inside a trusted NLTK data root or trusted corpus directory.

Steps

  1. Create a trusted corpus root and keep pathsec.ENFORCE=True with that root allowlisted.
  2. Place symlinked reader inputs such as header.xml, table.txt, or simN.lsp inside the root and point them to external files.
  3. Instantiate the corresponding corpus reader and call its normal public methods.
  4. Observe that parsed outside-root values are returned even though pathsec.open() blocks the same symlink targets.

Minimal reproducible excerpt

text
1{'ipipan': ['LEAK', 'TOPSECRET', 'CLASSIFIED'], 'crubadan': ['LEAK'], 'lin': [('LEAK', 9.5)]}

Impact

An attacker who can stage corpus files or symlinks under a trusted data root can disclose outside-root content through normal corpus-reader results, defeating the boundary NLTK documents for shared and untrusted-input environments.

Remediation

Preserve PathPointer and required_root semantics end to end. Replace direct open() calls with nltk.pathsec.open() or a reader helper that keeps the trusted-root boundary intact.

References


Fix + full-codebase audit (verified)

I swept every raw file open in the corpus readers, not just the three the umbrella named:

ReaderSiteAdvisoryRoot scoping
crubadantable.txt + <code>-3grams.txtp4rw / j5pwrequired_root=self.root
linsimN.lspp4rwrequired_root=self.root
xmldocsXMLCorpusView bare-string fileid934p (base reader)global fallback (view has no root)
pl196xtextids indexfound by auditrequired_root=self._root
mteMTEFileReadermvf5required_root threaded through 8 call sites
toolboxStandardFormat.open codecs.opencr8cglobal sandbox (low-level parser)
named_entityload_ace_file ann/text7qj2global sandbox
nkjpXML_Tool source filep4rw classrequired_root=self._root

ipipan already validates via the earlier #3727 fix — unchanged.

Fix

Each site now calls nltk.pathsec.validate_path(path, required_root=…) before opening. Where the reader has a concrete corpus root, the check is scoped with required_root (rejects any escape outside that root). XMLCorpusView carries no root, so it falls back to the global data-root sandbox via getattr(self, "_root", None) — which also avoids an AttributeError on the bare-string path.

Reproduced (captured)

text
1raw open(symlink) reads: 'TOPSECRET_OUTSIDE_ROOT' <- the bypass
2validate_path(symlink, required_root): ValueError -> BLOCKS the escape
3validate_path(legit in-root): PASSED <- loads normally

Honest residual

The global-sandbox fallback (toolbox, named_entity, xmldocs-view) is only as tight as the allowed-roots list, which currently includes the system temp dir. Scoping every reader with required_root and removing the temp dir from the allowed roots would harden it further (separate advisory / task).

Tests

test_corpus_reader_pathsec.py — symlink escape rejected, in-root file allowed, XMLCorpusView string-fileid no AttributeError, MTEFileReader out-of-root rejected. 46 existing corpus/toolbox tests pass; all edited modules import (no circular import). pre-commit (black/isort/ruff) clean.


Scope caveat

validate_path blocks every symlink escape variant (verified) and equals pathsec.open()'s guarantee, but does NOT block hardlinks (no symlink to resolve; tracked separately as GHSA-f794-5jv7-7672) or the validate-then-open TOCTOU race (shared by pathsec.open; needs O_NOFOLLOW/openat).

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