In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header dev_vali

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header

dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when
zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:

 1if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
 2    memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev->hard_header_len - len);
 3    return true;
 4}

Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was
allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is
reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation,
the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.

This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because
the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the
reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding
branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the
snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.

This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where
len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree
variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the
CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no
real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.

Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of
dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and
have no memory safety impact.