In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment() ip_do_fragment() subt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment()

ip_do_fragment() subtracts the IPv4 header length from the effective
MTU and passes the resulting payload MTU to ip_frag_next().

If the effective MTU is smaller than hlen + 8, ip_frag_next() rounds
the fragment payload length down to zero. The fragmentation state then
never makes forward progress: state->left, state->ptr and state->offset
stay unchanged while ip_do_fragment() keeps allocating and transmitting
header-only fragments until the softlockup detector fires.

This is reproducible with a route installed using "mtu lock 20", but it
is also reproducible without route MTU lock, for example by forwarding a
packet to a device whose MTU is 20.

Fix it in ip_do_fragment() by rejecting mtu < hlen + 8 with -EMSGSIZE,
matching the existing IPv6 fragmentation check.