In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/query: cap user size passed to copy_struct_to_user io_handle_

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/query: cap user size passed to copy_struct_to_user

io_handle_query_entry() clamps hdr.size for the inbound copy_from_user()
but keeps the original user value as usize. copy_struct_to_user() uses
that usize and, when it is larger than the kernel result, clear_user()s
the trailing bytes.

As hdr.size is a __u32, a query can request nearly 4 GiB of zeroing,
including on the error path where res_size stays 0. The interface is
reachable without a ring via IORING_REGISTER_QUERY.

Reject sizes larger than PAGE_SIZE, as recommended for copy_struct_*
interfaces.