Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession

Summary

When Steeltoe's certificate-based authorization (UseCertificateAuthorization) is configured, the default configuration of the middleware relies on the X-Client-Cert HTTP header to identify the client certificate, without verifying private-key possession. This header is not stripped by common Cloud Foundry routers (like Gorouter or Envoy) on inbound requests.

Impact

An attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space can spoof the X-Client-Cert header. This allows the attacker to bypass SameOrg and SameSpace authorization policies, granting unauthorized access to protected endpoints for the duration of the certificate's validity period.

Affected configuration

• The application uses AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() for inter-service authorization.
• Inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP.
• The application's endpoints are network-accessible to the attacker (e.g., exposed to the internet via a public Cloud Foundry route, or the attacker has access to the internal Cloud Foundry network).

Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:

• Restrict UseCertificateForwarding to trusted proxy source IPs using ForwardedHeadersOptions.KnownProxies and KnownNetworks.
• Change the forwarding header to X-Forwarded-Client-Cert so that Cloud Foundry Gorouter and Envoy header stripping mechanisms apply to inbound untrusted requests.
• Add a secondary authorization layer (e.g., a shared secret or mutual TLS at the proxy layer) for sensitive endpoints.
• Ensure the application is not bound to a public route unless explicitly required. Use Cloud Foundry internal routes (e.g., .apps.internal) and container-to-container network policies to strictly limit network access to intended internal clients.