In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow xdr_buf_trim()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow

xdr_buf_trim() trims len bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by
walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step
uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section
holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the
total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp:

 1fix_len:
 2        buf->len -= (len - trim);

When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum
of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned
subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches
xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state:

 1buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
 2buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip);
 3xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);

buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at
page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more
bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates
as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR
decoder.

Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero:

 1buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim);

On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim)
is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No
callers change behavior outside the underflow case.