In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix stale s2s_cp_stateids IDR entry for async COPY For an async

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix stale s2s_cp_stateids IDR entry for async COPY

For an async COPY, nfsd4_copy() called nfs4_init_copy_state() before
dup_copy_fields(), so the s2s_cp_stateids IDR was pointed at
&u->copy->cp_stateid -- memory in the per-rqstp COMPOUND buffer that is
reused by the next request. dup_copy_fields() copies only the value into
async_copy, so the IDR slot dangled at the transient buffer for the whole
background copy. Any IDR walker then dereferences reused request memory:
the laundromat reads cs_type from it and, if the bytes look like an
expired NFS4_COPYNOTIFY_STID, follows into
refcount_dec()/idr_remove()/kfree() on garbage; manage_cpntf_state() has
the same exposure via idr_find().

Duplicate the fields first, then register the stateid on the stable
async_copy. result->cb_stateid is unchanged.