In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: cap decoded POSIX ACL count to bound sort cost nfsd4_decode_posi

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: cap decoded POSIX ACL count to bound sort cost

nfsd4_decode_posixacl() reads a u32 entry count off the wire and passes
it straight to posix_acl_alloc() and sort_pacl_range(). The latter is
an O(n^2) bubble sort, so a client-chosen count drives unbounded CPU in
the server's compound processing path.

 1nfsd4_decode_posixacl()
 2  xdr_stream_decode_u32(&count)       /* uncapped u32 */
 3  posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL)
 4  sort_pacl_range(*acl, 0, count - 1) /* O(n^2) bubble sort */

The encoder side in the same file already rejects ACLs whose a_count
exceeds NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES, but the decoder introduced in commit
5fc51dfc2eb1 ("NFSD: Add support for XDR decoding POSIX draft ACLs")
omitted the symmetric check.

Fix by rejecting a wire count greater than NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES with
nfserr_inval, before any allocation, so the sort is bounded by
NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES^2 comparisons.

While we're in here, also fix the nfserr_resource return if
posix_acl_alloc() fails. That's not a legal error code for v4.1+. Change
it to return nfserr_jukebox as that's more appropriate for memory
allocation failures.