In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: release path refs on follow_down() error nfsd_cross_mnt() initia

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: release path refs on follow_down() error

nfsd_cross_mnt() initializes a local struct path with mntget() and
dget() before calling follow_down(). On a negative return the error
arm jumps to out without releasing those references:

 1err = follow_down(&path, follow_flags);
 2if (err < 0)
 3        goto out;

follow_down() never drops the caller's entry-time refs on any error
sub-case; for example a pre-cross d_manage() failure leaves path
untouched, so the mntget()/dget() taken on entry survive the call.

Every other early-exit arm in nfsd_cross_mnt() (other-namespace
return, IS_ERR(exp2), and the success tail after the swap) already
calls path_put(&path); the err < 0 arm is the lone omission. The
leak inflates mnt_count and d_count on each failed cross-mount,
blocking umount and pinning dentries against the shrinker, and is
reachable by any authenticated NFS client through nfsd_lookup_dentry
or the NFSv4 READDIR encode path.

Fix by calling path_put(&path) before the goto out in the err < 0
arm so the entry-time refs are released on all follow_down() error
returns.