In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size smb_check_pe

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size

smb_check_perm_dacl() validates that the DACL fits inside the NT
security descriptor, but then bounds its two ACE walks by the
remaining NTSD length (acl_size) rather than the DACL's declared
size (pdacl_size).

When pdacl->size is smaller than the trailing NTSD buffer, bytes
after the declared DACL boundary - still inside the stored security
descriptor - are parsed as ACEs during access checks. A crafted
DACL can place an access-granting ACE beyond pdacl->size, and the
current code accepts it during SMB2_CREATE access validation, while
parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl() stop at pdacl_size.

Bound both ACE walks by pdacl_size to match the DACL boundary
semantics used elsewhere in the server.

Validation:

• semantic KUnit harness shows the post-boundary ACE is selected
  before the fix and rejected (EACCES) after it
• linux master (7.2-rc6), x86_64