In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr() In mi_enum_attr()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr()

In mi_enum_attr(), the start/end VCN validation for non-resident
attributes is:

 1if (svcn > evcn + 1) goto out;

When evcn is U64_MAX the "evcn + 1" expression wraps to 0 and any svcn
passes the check. For evcn values close to U64_MAX (but not equal to it)
the right-hand side is still a meaningless near-wrap upper bound, so a
malformed on-disk attribute with svcn == 0 and evcn near U64_MAX can pass
mi_enum_attr() unrejected.

VCN (virtual cluster number) is a cluster index, so any valid evcn is
bounded by the volume's total cluster count, which ntfs3 holds in
sbi->used.bitmap.nbits (set up in ntfs_init_from_boot() before any caller
of mi_enum_attr() runs). Reject evcn values that fall outside this range.

However, an empty non-resident attribute (no allocated clusters) is
legitimately encoded with svcn == 0 and evcn == -1 (U64_MAX), e.g. via
attr->nres.evcn = cpu_to_le64((u64)vcn - 1) with vcn == 0. That sentinel
must keep passing, so exclude evcn == U64_MAX from the range check. The
existing "svcn > evcn + 1" test still tolerates the sentinel ("0 > 0" is
false) and continues to require svcn == 0 for it, while the range check
rejects every other out-of-range evcn and thereby also defuses the
"evcn + 1" wraparound.

svcn does not need its own bound: once evcn < nbits, "svcn > evcn + 1"
implies svcn <= nbits.

[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed evcn check]