In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0 A peer can send a W

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

svcrdma: Reject Write/Reply chunks with segcount 0

A peer can send a Write or Reply chunk whose segcount field is zero.
xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount > rc_maxpages, so zero
passes the range check, and xdr_inline_decode(stream, 0) returns the
current (non-NULL) cursor without advancing. The function returns
true and pcl_alloc_write() then links a struct svc_rdma_chunk with
ch_segcount == 0 onto rc_write_pcl or rc_reply_pcl.

An earlier patch in this series made pcl_for_each_segment() safe for
ch_segcount == 0, so this no longer drives the memory walk it used
to. Rejecting the malformed frame at the decode boundary is still
worthwhile as defense in depth: it keeps degenerate zero-segment
chunks off the parsed chunk lists entirely, so any future consumer
that walks ch_segments directly cannot observe one, and it makes the
zero-floor easy to backport to trees where the macro change is more
intrusive. RFC 8166 has no meaning for a Write/Reply chunk that
describes no remote buffer, so no legitimate client is affected.

xdr_check_reply_chunk() funnels Reply chunks through
xdr_check_write_chunk() and inherits the same rejection.

pcl_alloc_write() also links each chunk onto the parsed chunk list
before filling its segment array. If a future change weakens the
segcount-0 rejection, an incomplete chunk is visible to consumers
during the fill loop. Reorder so that list_add_tail() follows the
segment fill loop, ensuring only fully-populated chunks appear on
the list.