In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: dsa: bcm_sf2: bound the CFP rule dump by the caller's buffer size

bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_get_all() walks the whole cfp.unique bitmap into
rule_locs[] without consulting nfc->rule_cnt, which is how many entries
the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN
and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so
once an admin has installed CFP rules any user can ask for fewer slots
than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt
of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it.