In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame() Whi

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()

While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least
sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame
with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte
header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2).

When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives:

1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false).
2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3.
3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns
   NULL without advancing skb->data.
4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled
   3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as
   application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer
   control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0.

Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also
require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len).