In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff

__skb_flow_dissect() computes key_control->thoff using:

key_control->thoff = min_t(u16, nhoff, skb ? skb->len : hlen);

min_t(u16, ...) casts both arguments to u16 before comparing them.
Whenever skb->len (or hlen) modulo 65536 is smaller than nhoff, the
truncated length wins and thoff is set to a bogus small value, even
when the dissection succeeded. For example, an IPv4/TCP frame with
skb->len == 65540 and nhoff == 34 gets thoff == 4, so callers such as
skb_probe_transport_header() point the transport header inside the
Ethernet header.

Such skbs are not exotic:

• At the time of commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector: properly cap
  thoff field"), AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR could already build GSO
  skbs larger than 64KB (MTU checks are skipped for GSO, and
  alloc_skb_with_frags() accepted up to MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17) order-0
  pages on top of the linear part).
• BIG TCP now makes skbs larger than 64KB common.
• The following patch makes tun_get_user() dissect IFF_TAP frames
  before eth_type_trans() pulls the Ethernet header, so a GSO frame
  carrying a 65522..65535 byte L3 packet will be dissected with
  skb->len in [65536, 65549].

Compare as u32 instead. If the resulting offset cannot be represented
in the u16 key_control->thoff, cap it to U16_MAX and report the
dissection as failed rather than silently returning a wrong transport
offset. thoff is still set on failure, as some callers (such as
eth_get_headlen()) use it regardless of the return value.