In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: don't let a pseudo dentry become the root of a mount d_allo

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: don't let a pseudo dentry become the root of a mount

d_alloc_pseudo() hands out dentries for pipes, sockets and other files
that are never anyone's child or parent. They carry DCACHE_NORCU and
dentry_free() frees them right away because no lockless path walk can
ever reach them. That holds as long as such a dentry isn't the root of
a mount. But bind mounting /proc/self/fd/<fd> of such a file does
exactly that.

Most callers of alloc_file_pseudo() put their files on kernel-internal
mounts and may_copy_tree() refuses those. bpf_token_create() doesn't. It
places the token file on the bpffs mount the caller handed it and that
mount is in the caller's mount namespace so the clone goes through:

mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<token> <file>
open_tree(tokfd, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH | OPEN_TREE_CLONE) + move_mount()

__follow_mount_rcu() then loads ->mnt_root of that mount, reads d_seq
and d_flags of the dentry and only then checks mount_lock. The dentry
can be gone by then. The final mntput() of an unmounted parent unhooks
a child that stayed attached to it under mount_lock alone. When the
child's holder does the final put right after that the root is dput()
and freed immediately while a walker that found the mount hashed still
looks at it.

Refuse to clone a mount with a DCACHE_NORCU dentry as its root. Nothing
sensible can be done with a bind mount of a bpf token anyway.