In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt: reject the lmk IV mode with AEAD ciphers A "capi:" table lin

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm-crypt: reject the lmk IV mode with AEAD ciphers

A "capi:" table line that pairs an AEAD cipher with the lmk IV mode,
for example "capi:gcm(aes)-lmk" with the integrity:28:aead option,
causes an oops when it is loaded. lmk sets tfms_count to 64, but
crypt_alloc_tfms_aead only allocates one transform, so crypt_setkey
reads past the end of the tfms_aead array and calls crypto_aead_setkey
on the values it finds there.

lmk exists for compatibility with Loop-AES, which uses CBC, so refuse
it with an AEAD cipher rather than allocate 64 AEAD transforms. The
check cannot go in crypt_iv_lmk_ctr with the other lmk checks, because
the IV constructor runs after crypt_set_key.

Note that this is not a security bug because the memory corruption can
only be triggered by root.