In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6

io_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for
AF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28
bytes.

The IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which
already holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to
the socket layer unchanged.

At addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address
zero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that
denies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P
rejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.

Use SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when
absent.

The threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)
comparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my
instructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified
the bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same
code.