In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open() st

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()

st_remove() drops the probe reference on the scsi_tape with kref_put()
and only afterwards removes its index from st_index_idr. If that was the
last reference, scsi_tape_release() frees the structure while it is
still published in the idr.

scsi_tape_get(), called from st_open(), looks up the tape in
st_index_idr and takes a reference under st_ref_mutex and
st_index_lock. remove_cdevs() does not wait for opens that are already
past chrdev_open(), so an open that is blocked on st_ref_mutex while
st_remove() holds it can take the mutex as soon as st_remove() drops it,
find the freed tpnt in the idr and call kref_get() on it:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in st_open
Write of size 4 ...
st_open (drivers/scsi/st.c:254 drivers/scsi/st.c:1291)
chrdev_open
...
Freed by task ...:
kfree
st_remove (drivers/scsi/st.c:4512)

Remove the index from the idr before dropping the reference, all under
st_ref_mutex. A concurrent scsi_tape_get() now either runs first and
holds a valid reference that keeps the tape alive, or runs afterwards
and finds nothing, so st_open() fails with -ENXIO.

This restores the ordering st_remove() had before the conversion to
st_index_idr, where the tape was unpublished from scsi_tapes[] before
the final kref_put().